Who is a Refugee?: Twenty-Five years of Domestic Implementation and Judicial Interpretation of the 1969 OAU and 1951 UN Refugee Conventions in Post-Apartheid South Africa by Maluwa, Tiyanjana & Katz, Anton, SC
Penn State Law eLibrary 
Journal Articles Faculty Works 
2020 
Who is a Refugee?: Twenty-Five years of Domestic 
Implementation and Judicial Interpretation of the 1969 OAU and 
1951 UN Refugee Conventions in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
Tiyanjana Maluwa 
Anton Katz SC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/fac_works 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons 
Who is a Refugee?:
Twenty-Five years of Domestic
Implementation and Judicial Interpretation
of the 1969 OAU and 1951 UN Refugee
Conventions in Post-Apartheid South Africa
TIYANJANA MALUWA* AND ANTON KATZ SC**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
I. The Oau Refugee Convention: Expansion of the Un Refugee Convention Definition
and Other Aspects
A. Expanding the Definition of a Refugee
B. Reaffirming the Principle of Non-refoulement
C. Exploring the Right to Asylum
D. Explaining the Other Aspects: Burden-Sharing, Temporary Protection,
and Voluntary Repatriation
II. Refugee Status Determination Procedures under South African Law
A. Refugee Status Determination Procedure, 1994 to 2000
B. Refugee Status Determination Procedure under the Refugees Act, 1998
(i) Asylum Seekers: "Section 22 Permit"
(ii) Decisions on Asylum Applications
C. Objectives and Other Aspects of the Refugees Act, 1998
1. Non-refoulement and Access to South African Territory
2. Treatment of Asylum Seekers and Refugees: Detention,
Exclusion and Cessation
(i) Detention of Failed Asylum Seekers
(ii) Exclusion from Refugee Status
(iii) Cessation of Refugee Status
III. Judicial Interpretation of the Oau Refugee Convention Definition
A. Definition of a Refugee under South African Law
B. Burden, Standard of Proof, and Consequences of Refugee Status
* H. Laddie Montague Chair in Law & Professor of Law and International Affairs,
Pennsylvania State Univeristy-Univeristy Park, PA.
**Advocate & Senior Counsel; Member of the Cape Bar, South Africa & New York Bar.
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 27 #2 (Spring 2020)
@ Indiana University Maurer School of Law
129
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 27:2
C. Interpretation of the Expanded OAU Refugee Convention Definition
1. Events Seriously Disturbing Public Order
2. Political Opinion
3. Membership of a Particular Social Group
CONCLUSION
ABSTRACT
As a party to the UN Refugee Convention and the OAU Refugee
Convention, South Africa is obligated to apply international refugee law
when addressing the protection needs of asylum seekers in the country.
The Refugees Act, 1998 encapsulates the cardinal principles of the two
conventions. This essay discusses how government officials and judges
have interpreted and applied these principles in asylum application
cases. These cases demonstrate that officials are either not always fully
conversant with the legal obligations, incumbent upon the government,
arising from both international law and domestic law or purposefully
ignore them. For the most part, officials tend to treat asylum seekers
presumptively as economic migrants rather than bona fide refugees
entitled to proper scrutiny under the criteria set out in the refugee
conventions. This approach has resulted in gaps between legal protection
and practical protection of refugees in South Africa and has on several
occasions been criticized and rejected by courts, including the
Constitutional Court of South Africa.
INTRODUCTION
South Africa shares the distinction with only a few other countries
of being, at various times in its history, either a refugee-sending country
(country of origin) or a refugee-receiving country (host country). The ebb
and flow of refugees into and out of South Africa has varied markedly
over the years, and the refugee situation has been the subject of
scholarly debate and discussion.1 On the one hand, South Africa has
hosted asylum seekers and refugees throughout its modern history,
particularly since attaining the status of a fully independent state in the
early twentieth century. 2 On the other hand, the three decades of the
1. For this essay, we partly draw on some material which appears in our co-authored
chapter, Anton Katz & Tiyanjana Maluwa, Refugees and Stateless Persons, in DUGARD'S
INTERNATIONAL LAw: A SoUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 502-38 (5th ed. 2019) (discussing
the legal regime for refugee protection in South Africa).
2. The earliest accounts of refugee flight into precolonial South Africa can be traced to
the early decades of European settlement of the Cape of Good Hope in the latter half of the
seventeenth century, with the arrival of French Huguenots in 1688. Two and half
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anti-apartheid and national liberation struggle from the early 1960s to
the early 1990s forced significant numbers of South Africans to flee the
country and seek refuge in other African countries and elsewhere. 3
However, since the end of apartheid, South Africa has largely become a
host country to refugees and asylum seekers, mostly from other African
countries. These include Mozambique and Zimbabwe, on the border of
South Africa, and more distant countries such as the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Burundi, in Central Africa; and Eritrea and
Somalia, in the Horn of Africa. During the five-year period from 2006 to
2011, for example, South Africa reportedly received the highest number
of new asylum applications per year of any country in the world. 4
Although the number of asylum seekers has declined progressively over
the decade from 2008 to 2018, South Africa remains one of the world's
major destinations for new asylum seekers. Yet it is no longer in the top
ten countries hosting asylum seekers.5 By mid-2018, the number of
centuries later, subsequent refugees included Jews escaping from Hitler's Germany and
the Holocaust in Europe from the early 1930s onwards. See generally PIETER COERTZEN,
THE HUGUENOTS OF SOUTH AFRICA 1688-1988 (1988) (discussing the arrival,
incorporation, and contribution of this group of settlers). See also Mark Boucher,
Huguenot Refugees: Some Links Between the Cape, France and England in the Early
Eighteenth Century, 20 HISTORIA 55, 55 (1975).
3. The number of South Africans who went into exile because of apartheid from the
early 1960s has been estimated at between 40,000 and 60,000. See Zosa 0. De Sas
Kropiwnicki, The Meeting of Myths and Realities: The "Homecoming" of Second-Generation
Exiles in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 30 REFUGE 79, 79 (2014). These estimates do not
include South Africans who migrated and settled in other countries without seeking or
being granted formal refugee status in those countries or being designated as such by the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). According to the
UNHCR, by mid-2018, the number of refugees and asylum-seekers of South African origin
in other countries were only 489 and 145, respectively. See U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY,
GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2018, at 73 (2019),
http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/.
4. U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY, GLOBAL TRENDS 2012: DISPLACEMENT - THE NEW 21ST
CENTURY CHALLENGE 26 (2013), http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/country/51bacb0f9/unhcr-
global-trends-2012.html.
5. See S. Afr. Dep't of Home Affairs, White Paper on International Migration, at 59-63
(July 2017), http://www.dha.gov.za/WhitePaperonInternationalMigration-20170602.pdf.
See also U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY, supra note 3, at 42. Some researchers and non-
governmental organizations working on refugee issues have questioned the methodology
used by the South African Department of Home Affairs and the UNHCR for compiling
their statistics over the years. See generally Richard Stupart, Is South Africa Home to
More Than a Million Asylum Seekers? The Numbers Don't Add up, AFR. CHECK,
http://africacheck.org/reports/south-africa-home-million-refugees-numbers-dont-add-up/
(last updated Feb, 8, 2018) (challenging the claim in the UNHCR's report for 2015 that
South Africa was home to more than a million asylum-seekers and had the highest
number of unresolved asylum cases in the world; and arguing that the combined figure of
more than 3.2 million refugees and asylum-seekers was based on a flawed reading of the
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refugees and asylum seekers of concern to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in South Africa stood at 89,285
and 184,203, respectively.6 Despite this drop in numbers, the refugees
and asylum seekers question remains a challenge in South Africa, in
part because it is often conflated with the larger, and politically
controversial issue, of illegal immigration.7
The year 2019 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of the
Organization of African Union Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 1969 (OAU Refugee
Convention), 8 and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the emergence of post-
apartheid South Africa. 9 The year 2021 will mark the seventieth
anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees of 1951 (UN Refugee Convention). 10 These
anniversaries present an opportune moment to reflect upon the
relevance and impact of the two conventions in South Africa, especially
as they relate to the treatment of asylum seekers and the determination
of refugee status. More attention is given to the OAU Refugee
Convention in this respect, not only because it establishes Africa's
regional refugee protection regime, but also because its adoption was
partly motivated by the need to address the situation of refugees fleeing
apartheid and minority rule in South Africa. As Marina Sharpe has
observed, "[the] attention paid by the OAU to refugees was very much a
available data and the continued counting of persons who had moved out of the
asylum system).
6. U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY, supra note 3, at 67.
7. See generally Oluwaseun Tella, Understanding Xenophobia in South Africa: The
Individual, the State and the International System, 8 INSIGHT ON AFR. 142 (2016)
(analyzing the recurrent anti-immigrant attitudes and attacks in South Africa).
8. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10,
1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter OAU Refugee Convention]. South Africa acceded to
the OAU Refugee Convention on Dec. 15, 1995. There is a tendency among some
commentators nowadays to refer to it as the "AU Refugee Convention', which is wrong as
it misrepresents the official title of the treaty. See, e.g., Cristiano D'Orsi, The AU
Convention on Refugees and the Concept of Asylum, 3 PACE INT'L L. REV. 220, 220 (2012).
9. Apartheid, a system of institutionalized racial segregation, came to an end in the
early 1990s in a series of steps that led to the formation of a non-racial, democratic
government. Formally, post-apartheid South Africa came into existence with the
inauguration of Nelson Mandela as president on May 10, 1994, following the first
democratic election held on Apr. 27, 1994. Apartheid South Africa was not a party to the
UN Refugee Convention and, as a non-member of the OAU, it could not join the OAU
Refugee Convention. It also had no domestic legislation on refugees.
10. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter UN Refugee Convention]. South Africa acceded to the UN Refugee
Convention on Jan. 12, 1996. On the same day, it also acceded to the Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees of 1967, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
[hereinafter Refugee Protocol].
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product of its concern with liberating Africa from colonialism and
minority rule.""
Refugees in South Africa are governed by a legal regime drawn from
international law, on the one hand, and South African municipal law, on
the other. 12 The former regime-international law-is based on
universal and regional conventions, rules of customary international
law, general principles of law, and ever-evolving standards in the
practice of states and international organizations, in particular the
Office of the UNHCR. 13 The latter regime-South African law-
comprises the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
(Constitution of South Africa), 14 the Refugees Act No. 130 of 1998
(Refugees Act), 15 and other national laws that may be relevant to
refugees, such as the Aliens Control Act No. 96 of 1991 (Aliens Control
Act), as amended, and the Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002 (Immigration
Act).1 6 The government of South Africa is obliged to respect and apply
this combined legal regime in asylum application procedures.
South Africa became a party to the OAU Convention in December
1995, 17 and to both the UN Refugee Convention and the Refugee
Protocol in January 1996.18 These international instruments, however,
required the adoption of "domesticating" legislation in order to become
effective within South Africa. The Refugees Act of 1998, which came
11. See Marina Sharpe, Organization ofAfrican Unity and African Union Engagement
with Refugee Protection: 1963-2011, 21 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 50, 55 (2013).
12. See generally REFUGEE LAW IN SOUTH AFRIcA (Fatima Khan & Tal Hanna Schreier
eds., 2014) (analyzing the application for asylum and the rights of refugees in
South Africa).
13. GA. Res. 428 (V) (Dec. 14, 1950). The mandate is to provide, on a non-political and
humanitarian basis, international protection to refugees and to seek permanent solutions
for them. It has been instrumental in developing standards that States-including some
that are not parties to the UN Refugee Convention-have followed in their treatment of
refugees and other persons in refugee-like situations.
14. South Africa first adopted the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1993, which came into force on Apr. 27, 1994, the day of the first democratic elections. S.
AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993. On May 8, 1996, the Parliament elected in 1994 adopted the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The new constitution was promulgated
by President Mandela on Dec. 10, 1996. It came into effect on Feb. 4, 1997, replacing the
Interim Constitution of 1993. S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
15. Although signed into law by President Nelson Mandela on Nov. 20, 1998, the
Refugees Act No. 130 of 1998 only came into operation on Apr. 1, 2000, following
proclamation of the commencement date by the President. See Refugees Act, GG 19544 (2
Dec. 1998) (S. Afr.). The Regulations to the Refugees Act were published on Apr. 6, 1998;
see Proclamation No. R. 22 of 2000, GG 21075 (6 Apr. 2000) (S. Afr.).
16. It was signed into law by President Thabo Mbeki on May 30, 2002; see Immigration
Act, GG 23478 (31 May 2002).
17. OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 8.
18. UN Refugee Convention and Refugee Protocol, supra note 10.
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into force on April 1, 2000, was adopted for this purpose. 19 Prior to the
enactment of this legislation, persons seeking asylum and refugee
status in South Africa were dealt with under the Aliens Control Act, 20
which was repealed by the Immigration Act in 2002.21 Under the post-
2000 legal regime, any foreigner recognized as a refugee and granted
asylum in South Africa is entitled to all the rights set out in the
Constitution, except those rights that apply only to South African
citizens.22
This essay seeks to provide an analysis of how the courts in South
Africa have interpreted and applied the legal protection for asylum
seekers and refugees enshrined in the Refugees Act, the OAU Refugee
Convention, and the UN Refugee Convention since South Africa's
accession to the conventions almost a quarter century ago. In particular,
the essay discusses how, in practice, the courts have adjudicated upon
disputes relating to South African procedures for refugee status
determination and related issues.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I examines the innovative
features of the OAU Refugee Convention, which have partially impacted
the scope of international refugee law and are most relevant for the
protection of asylum seekers and refugees in African countries parties to
the Convention, including South Africa. These features are: the
expanded refugee definition; the principle of non-refoulement; the
individual right to asylum; and other aspects, such as burden-sharing
and temporary protection. Of these features, the expanded refugee
definition, the principle of non-refoulement, and temporary protection
have been at issue in most of the refugee status determination cases in
South Africa.
19. Refugees Act of 1998, supra note 15.
20. The Aliens Control Act was amended by the Aliens Control Amendment Act 76 of
1995, which was specifically promulgated to bring the Act into conformity with the new,
post-apartheid constitutional requirements. Aliens Control Amendment Act 76 of 1995
(S. Afr.).
21. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Eisenberg & Associates 2003 (5) SA 281 (CC)
(S. Afr.).
22. Refugees Act 130 of 1998 § 27 (S. Mr.). All foreigners in South Africa are also
entitled to these rights. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996 §§ 7-37 (the Bill of Rights, enumerating
two types of rights: rights granted to "everyone" and rights limited to "citizens"; examples
of rights limited to citizens include the right to vote and universal adult suffrage; the right
to stand for public office; the right to free, fair and regular elections; and the right to form,
foin, and campaign for a political party (§19); and the right to a passport (§ 21(4))). See
also Union of Refugee Women v. Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority
2007 (4) SA 395 (CC) (S. Afr.); Lawyers for Human Rights v. Minister of Home Affairs 2004
(4) SA 125 (CC) at 6-7 para. 79 (S. Afr.).
134
WHO IS A REFUGEE?
Part II examines the procedures for refugee status determination,
both prior to and after the adoption of the Refugees Act, and issues
related to the treatment of failed asylum seekers: detention, exclusion,
and cessation of refugee status. We also examine other domestic
legislation relevant to refugee protection in South Africa. The discussion
highlights the failure of the Refugee Status Determination Officers
(RSDOs) to understand and apply the principles accurately in the OAU
and UN conventions regarding the legal protections for asylum seekers
and refugees. It also shows how, by contrast, South African courts have
acted as the foremost defenders and enforcers of these legal protections,
quite often overruling and setting aside decisions by RSDOs that deny
the grant of refugee status to asylum seekers who otherwise meet the
requirements laid down in the OAU Refugee Convention and IN
Refugee Convention.
In Part III, we turn to the provisions in the domestic legislation that
incorporate the expanded OAU Refugee Convention definition of a
refugee, and the approach of the South African courts in interpreting
and enforcing these provisions. The discussion focuses, in particular, on
three aspects of the refugee definition that have been at the heart of
most refugee status determination claims and decisions by government
officials and the courts: events that seriously disturb public order,
political opinion, and membership of a particular social group. The
various benches of the South African judiciary-the High Court, the
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), and the Constitutional Court-have
built up more refugee jurisprudence in the twenty-five years of the post-
apartheid era than judiciaries in other refugee-receiving African
countries have done over a longer period. However, while this period
has witnessed a fair amount of scholarly literature on refugee law and
protection in South Africa, there has not been as much extensive
analysis of the case law. 23
We conclude the discussion with the assertion that if the
government is unable or unwilling to fulfil its obligations, it falls upon
the judiciary to affirm, protect, and enforce the rights of asylum seekers
and refugees embodied in the Constitution of South Africa, domestic
legislation, and the international treaties to which South Africa is a
party. We argue that despite the failures of the executive authorities, in
23. Among scholars that have undertaken some analyses of the South African refugee
cases are Roni Amit, No Refuge: Flawed Status Determination and the Failures of South
Africa's Refugee System to Provide Protection, 23 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 458 (2011); Tal
Hanna Schreier, An Evaluation of South Africa's Application of the OAU Refugee
Definition, 25 REFUGE 53 (2008); Tamara Wood, Expanding Protection in Africa? Case
Studies of the Implementation of the 1969 African Refugee Convention's Expanded Refugee
Definition, 26 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 555 (2014).
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particular the RSDOs, and an environment of unmistakable hostility,
South African courts continue to play a vanguard role in holding the
government accountable for its failure to respect the legal protections of
refugees and asylum seekers in accordance with its international
treaty obligations.
I. THE OAU REFUGEE CONVENTION: EXPANSION OF THE UN REFUGEE
CONVENTION DEFINITION AND OTHER ASPECTS
When the OAU Refugee Convention was adopted in 1969,
international refugee law was still in its early stages of development. A
special UN conference had adopted the UN Refugee Convention
eighteen years earlier. At the time, only four African countries were
members of the UN: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Union of South
Africa. By the time that the OAU adopted its regional instrument, only
one of the four-Liberia-had ratified the UN Refugee Convention.
Although a few other newly independent African states had acceded to
the UN Convention in the intervening period, the adoption of the 1969
OAU Convention provided the first occasion that a group of states had
cooperated to establish a regional regime for the protection of refugees.
Against this background, African states incorporated rules and
principles that were strategically formulated to clarify and improve the
existing international law on refugee protection that had first been
enshrined in the UN Convention. Indeed, the OAU Refugee Convention
is described in its own terms in Article VIII(2) as "the effective regional
complement in Africa of the UN Convention." 24 In this respect, the
purported improvements relate to, in particular, the following broad
clusters of issues: broadening the definition of a refugee; the principle of
non-refoulement; the individual right to asylum; and burden-sharing,
temporary protection, and voluntary repatriation. We examine each of
these in turn in the following sections.
A. Expanding the Definition of a Refugee
The 1951 UN Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person who
is outside the country of his or her nationality (or place of habitual
residence, in the case of stateless persons) due to a "well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
24. Article VIII(2) provides that: "The present Convention shall be the effective
regional complement in Africa of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees." See OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 8.
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particular social group or political opinion. . . .or owing to such fear is
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country." 25
In their analysis of the UN Refugee Convention definition of a
refugee, James Hathaway and Michelle Foster identify seven elements
to the definition: (1) alienage, (2) well-founded fear, (3) serious harm, (4)
failure of state protection, (5) nexus to civil and political status, (6)
needing protection, and (7) deserving protection. 26 Before proceeding to
offer deeply comprehensive analyses of each of these factors in the rest
of their seminal treatise, Hathaway and Foster summarize each of the
seven elements. First, "alienage" means that the refugee is first and
foremost a person outside their country of origin or, in the case of a
stateless person, outside their country of former habitual residence. 27
Second, the requirement of a "well-founded fear" relates to the existence
of a "real chance" or objective risk, not subjective fear. 28 Third, "serious
harm"-arguably the central plank of the refugee definition-means
that there must be a real risk of being persecuted.29 Fourth, "failure of
state protection" is a requirement that entails both state unwillingness
and state inability to protect the individual.3 0 Fifth, the "nexus to civil
and political status" requirement means that any well-founded fear of
being persecuted be based on any one of the grounds stipulated in the
UN Refugee Convention. 31 Sixth, "needing protection" is an element
that asks whether the person requesting refugee status either has, or
can regain, the protection of their own country, or has access to
alternative forms of protection tantamount to national protection. 32 The
seventh and final requirement of "deserving protection" addresses the
situation whereby an at-risk person may nevertheless be excluded from
recognition and protection as a refugee because of their criminal or
quasi-criminal actions.33
Commentators have criticized the UN Refugee Convention on a
number of grounds, three of which stand out. First, its definition of a
refugee implies the exclusion of internally displaced persons (IDPs). A
persecuted person who fails to fulfil the alienage requirement is an IDP
25. This is a rephrasing of the extensive definition in Article 1(A) of the UN Refugee
Convention. For the full text see generally G.A. Res. 429 (V), (July 28, 1951); UN Refugee
Convention, supra note 10.
26. JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 13
(2d ed. 2014).
27. Id. at 14.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 15.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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and does not enjoy the protection of the international refugee law
regime. 34 Second, the picture that emerges from the jurisprudence in
Western countries and from the scholarship is that the meaning of
"well-founded fear of persecution" is contested. For example, it seems
clear that "well-founded fear of persecution" analytically consists of
three elements, namely (1) "well-founded fear" (that is genuine risk), (2)
"being persecuted" (that is the existence of serious harm), and (3)
"failure of state protection." While nearly all courts apply all these three
elements, the jurisprudence under each element has diverged
considerably, and not all courts evaluate the failure of state protection
in the analysis of persecution. Third, the UN Refugee Convention's
requirement that the refugee's persecution have a nexus to one or more
of the refugee's civil or political characteristics excludes persons fleeing
other kinds of life-threatening conditions or situations (such as famine,
drought, or environmental disasters). It also excludes migrants who flee
their countries primarily to escape harsh economic conditions and seek
opportunities for an improved standard of living elsewhere. Arguably,
many-perhaps a majority-of the African migrants that have made or
attempted the perilous journey across the Mediterranean Sea into
Europe in recent years belong to this category. Such migrants are
commonly referred to as "economic refugees." 35
So how does the OAU Refugee Convention change this?
Substantively, the OAU Refugee Convention expands the definition of a
refugee. While Article I, paragraph 1 of the OAU Refugee Convention
essentially reproduces the UN Refugee Convention definition,36 Article
I, paragraph expands this definition as follows:
34. The subsequent practice has been for the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR), at the request of the UN Secretary-General and the General
Assembly, to extend its mandate to IDPs. See TIYANJANA MALUWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN POsT-COLONIAL AFRICA 178 (1999); Arthur C. Helton, What is Refugee Protection?, INT'L
J. REFUGEE L. 119, 120 (1990).
35. See generally ALAN DOWTY, CLOSED BORDERS: THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (1987); Elizabeth G. Ferris, Overview: Refugees and World
Politics, in REFUGEES AND WORLD POLITICS (Elizabeth G. Ferris ed. 1985); LEON
GORDENKER, REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1987); Andrew E. Shacknove, Who is
a Refugee?, 95 ETHICS 274 (1985) (discussing how refugees are dealt with in the
international community); see also MALUWA, supra note 34, at 178.
36. OAU Convention, Article I(1) provides: "For the purposes of this Convention, the
term 'refugee' shall mean every person who, owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."
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The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who,
owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign
domination or events seriously disturbing public order in
either part or the whole of his country of origin or
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual
residence in order to seek refuge in another place
outside his country of origin or nationality.37
The OAU Refugee Convention definition aimed to include people
who were forced into flight from African countries that were still
engaged in anti-apartheid and anti-colonial liberation struggles, and to
include those fleeing civil wars in their countries.3 8 Historical context
shaped the contours of this definition. 39 The need to respond to the
reality of the African continent at the time-armed conflict arising from
anti-colonial struggles, internal civil wars, and the resulting exoduses-
were overriding considerations for the new definition. 40 Tamara Wood
describes the context of the adoption of the OAU Refugee Convention as
follows:
The context of the Convention's adoption is well
understood. In 1969, Africa was a continent still very
much engaged in the process of decolonization; many
African states continued to struggle against colonial and
minority powers and this led to frequent movements of
people, as many left their countries to escape colonial
oppression.41
Indeed, it has been noted that the "specific aspects" referred to in the
very title of the OAU Refugee Convention "were largely the result of
persistent colonial domination and minority rule on the continent." 42
Medard Rwelamira describes this historical context thus:
[The] question of whether the African Convention
extends protection to persons engaged in military
struggle remains a controversial one. [This] issue was
37. Id. at art. (I)(2).
38. See generally Sharpe, supra note 11, at 55-69 (discussing the legislative history of
the OAU Refugee Convention refugee definition).
39. Eduardo Arboleda, Refugee Definition in Africa and Latin America: The Lessons of
Pragmatism, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 185, 192 (1991).
40. MALUWA, supra note 34, at 180.
41. Wood, supra note 23, at 557.
42. Sharpe, supra note 11, at 66.
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discussed at length at the Conference on the Legal,
Economic and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problem
held in Addis Ababa in 1967. General consensus existed
that the question of freedom fighters was intricately
linked to the question of subversion. While support of
freedom fighters intent on overthrowing a government of
an independent states could not conceivably be condoned
in any way, it was accepted unreservedly that in a spirit
of African solidarity it was the duty of every African
country to assist freedom fighters who were fighting for
the liberation of the African continent from colonial and
racial domination. [It] was against this background that
Article 1(2) was added to the general refugee definition
from the 1951 Convention. 43
The OAU Refugee Convention's expansion of the refugee definition
improves upon the UN Refugee Convention definition by explicitly
introducing objective criteria for determining refugee status that are
dependent on the prevailing situations in the refugee's country of
origin." As Eduardo Arboleda has pointed out, "[The] new definition of
refugee is qualitatively different from the classical definitions[,] for it
considers situations where the qualities of deliberateness and
discrimination need. not be present." 45 The generalized nature of the
refugee-generating events-external aggression, occupation, foreign
domination, and events seriously disturbing public order-means that
the definition provides better protection to persons fleeing widespread
or indiscriminate forms of harm, such as civil war. 46 A nontrivial
43. Medard R. Rwelamira, Some Reflections on the OAU Convention on Refugees: Some
Pending Issues, 16 COMP. & INT'L L. J. S. AFR. 155, 169 (1983).
44. See generally Emmanuel Opoku Awuku, Refugee Movements in Africa and the OAU
Convention on Refugees, 39 J. AFR. L. 79, 80 (1995); George Okoth-Obbo, Thirty Years On:
A Legal Review of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa, 20 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 79 (2001); Micah B. Rankin, Extending the
Limits or Narrowing the Scope? Deconstructing the OAU Refugee Definition Thirty Years
On, 21 S. AFR. J. HUM_ RTS. 406 (2005); Bahame T. Nyanduga, Refugee Protection under
the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 47
GERMAN Y3. INT'L L 85, 86 (2004) (analyzing the OAU and its approach to and
management of refugee issues).
45. See Arboleda, supra note 39, at 195.
46. Alice Edwards, Refugee Status Determination in Africa, 14 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
204, 221 (2006); Okoth-Obbo, supra note 44, at 112. See also Office of the United Nations
High Comm'r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedure and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status, ¶ 164, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK].
The UNHCR HANDBOOK is intended as a guide for government officials dealing with the
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construction of this definition also covers individuals forced to flee from
their countries of origin or habitual residence due to other factors, such
as environmental and other humanitarian disasters. 47 Moreover, as is
widely accepted, the OAU Refugee Convention's expanded refugee
definition is particularly suited to group-based refugee status
determination and better protection in situations of mass influx. 48 Mass
influx has characterized most refugee movements in Africa in the past
and continues to the present day.
Equally important, the requirement that the relevant event occur
in either "the whole or part" of the refugee's country of origin removes
the so-called "internal protection alternative" (sometimes referred to as
"internal flight" or "internal relocation"). James Hathaway and Michelle
Foster have noted that some states construe the internal protection
alternative as implied in the UN Refugee Convention definition and
that according to those states, the internal protection alternative
requires a refugee to seek protection, first, elsewhere within their own
country before they may qualify for refugee status in another country. 49
But the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has rejected the
internal protection alternative. Rather, the UNHCR holds the view that
the internal protection alternative is not a necessary part of the UN
Refugee Convention's refugee definition and that it cannot be used to
undermine the UN Refugee Convention's aims or international human
rights norms.50 The OAU Refugee Convention is unique in removing
this possibility.5 1
In brief, the expanded definition in the OAU Refugee Convention
provides a pragmatic solution to the problem of determining refugee
determination of refugee status. Some judges in South Africa have invoked it in their
judicial decisions. See infra note 273.
47. Some writers argue that Article 1(2) of the OAU Refugee Convention definition
should be construed to allow for protection of persons displaced by environmental
disasters or climate change. See, e.g., Jessica B. Cooper, Environmental Refugees: Meeting
the Requirements of the Refugee Definition, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 480, 499 (1998); Alice
Edwards, Refugee Status Determination in Africa, 14 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 204, 206
(2006); Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Toward a Broader Definition of Refugee: 20th Century
Development Trends, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 315, 326-27 (1989).
48. See IVOR JACKSON, THE REFUGEE CONCEPT IN GROUP SITUATIONS 193 (1999); Anais
Tuepker, On the Threshold of Africa: OAU and UN Definitions in South African Asylum
Practice, 15 J. REFUGEE STUD. 409, 411 (2002).
49. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 26, at 14-15, 332-61.
50. See Offce of the United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on
International Protection: Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative within the Context of
Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees, N 4, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/04 (2003).
51. See id. ¶ 5 ("Consideration of possible internal relocation areas is not relevant for
refugees coming under the purview of Article 1(2).").
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status during times of mass migrations or forced human population
displacement when individual determinations are impractical,
inadequate, or totally absent. 52 The definition also breaks new ground
in international law by embracing an additional category of persons as
refugees: namely, all those who are compelled to leave their country of
origin in order to escape violence, regardless of a specific connection to
political or civil status.
It is important to recall that the drafters of the OAU Refugee
Convention definition employed terms such as "external aggression,"
"occupation," and "foreign domination" at a time when they had not
acquired widely agreed or settled meanings in international law. 53
Clearly, the reference to these terms pointed at the historical situation
in some African states-especially in southern Africa-that were still
under colonial rule, foreign occupation, or governed by minority racist
regimes: South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South West
Africa (Namibia), and the various Portuguese African colonies.5 4 These
countries were theaters of national liberation wars, and the OAU's
expanded refugee definition extended protection to both freedom
fighters and to their supporters. 55 The incidents of intra-African
conflicts in the African Great Lakes region and the massive refugee
movements those conflicts have generated during the last two-and-a-
half decades have been a reminder of this problem and the continuing
relevance of the expanded OAU refugee definition.
In this respect, the drafters of the definition did not primarily
consider the strict legal meaning of its terminology and case law, but
were rather more concerned with providing a flexible and pragmatic
solution to the protection of asylum seekers and refugees.5 6 At the same
time, however, Adetola Onayemi and Olufemi Elias have rightly pointed
out that this does not mean that the OAU Refugee Convention
establishes a lax regime.5 7 On the contrary, while the OAU Refugee
Convention broadens the definition in certain respects, it also expands
52. Arboleda, supra note 39, at 195.
53. MALUWA, supra note 34, at 180.
54. See Rwelamira, supra note 43 (discussing the relevance of the struggles against
colonialism, apartheid, and racist minority rule in these southern African countries as a
factor in the adoption of the OAU Refugee Convention and its expanded refugee definition);
see also Sharpe, supra note 11, at 55-69 (discussing the legislative history of the
Convention and its refugee definition).
55. See Rwelamira, supra note 43.
56. Arboleda, supra note 39, at 195.
57. Adetola Onayemi & Olufemi Elias, Aspects of Africa's Contribution to the
Development of International Law, in SHELDING HUMANITY: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw IN HONOUR OF JUDGE ABDUL G. KOROMA 591, 595 (Charles C. Jalloh & Olufemi Elias
eds., 2015).
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the permissible bases for which a hosting State may revoke status or
exclude a refugee in the first place. 58
Scholars of refugee law and refugee studies, as well as experts and
institutions concerned with refugees, have commended the OAU
Refugee Convention's definition since its adoption as a significant
normative development in international refugee law. 59 Scholarly
commentaries have also celebrated the innovative character of the OAU
Refugee Convention, especially the expanded refugee definition, and
reaffirmed its status as a regional complement to the UN instrument.6 0
58. Compare OAU Refugee Convention, art. 1(4)(f),(g), with UN Refugee Convention,
art. 1C, F. The OAU Refugee Convention ceases to apply to any refugee who has
"committed a serious non-political crime outside his country of refuge after his admission
to that country as a refugee" or has "seriously infringed the purposes and objectives of the
Convention." OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 8. In terms of Article LC, the UN
Refugee Convention ceases to apply to any refugee who has "voluntarily re-availed himself
of the protection of the country of his nationality," or has "voluntarily re-acquired it," or
has "acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of his new
nationality," or has "voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or
outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution," or "can no longer, because
circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased
to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his
nationality," or being a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances in
connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, is able to
return to the country of his former habitual residence." U.N. Refugee Convention, supra
note 10, at art. 1(C). Article 1.F provides that the UN Refugee Convention shall not apply
to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that "(a) he
has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as
defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crime; (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." Id. at art. 1(F).
59. See, e.g., HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 26, at 2, n. 7.
60. There is a copious scholarly literature on the OAU Refugee Convention dating from
the earliest years following its adoption. See, e.g., Ousmane Goundiam, African Refugee
Convention, 2 MIGRATION NEWS 7 (1970); Paul Weis, The Convention of the Organisation
of African Unity Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 3 REV. DE
DROITS DE L'HOMME 449 (1970); Medard R. Rwelamira, Two Decades of the 1969 OAU
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1 INT'L J. REF. L.
557 (1989); Joe Oloka-Onyango, Human Rights, OAU Refugee Convention and the Refugee
Crisis in Africa: Forty Years After Geneva, 3 INT'L J. REF. L. 453 (1991); Rainer Hofmann,
Refugee Law in the African Context, 52 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 318 (1992); Christopher J.
Bakwesega, The OAU and African Refugees, in THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRIcAN UNITY
AFTER THIRTY YEARS 77 (Yassin El-Ayouty ed., 1994); Okoth-Obbo, supra note 44; Rankin,
supra note 44; and Marina Sharpe, The 1969 African Refugee Convention: Innovations,
Misconceptions, and Omissions, 58 McGILL L.J. 97 (2012). But see Sharpe, at 111-124
(acknowledging and discussing the OAU Refugee Convention's significant contributions to
refugee protection in Africa and its major legal innovations, but arguing that one of the
Convention's most misunderstood aspects is the notion that its definition of a refugee is
much broader than that in the UN Refugee Convention).
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The UNHCR's recognition of the normative importance of the OAU
Refugee Convention's definition was underscored by Ant6nio Guterres-
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees-in 2014 during the
commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of its adoption when he
declared that the Convention "is considered one of the most generous
and flexible documents on refugee protection."6 1
Finally, the influence of the OAU's expanded definition, can
specifically be seen through its incorporation into the domestic
legislation of countries both in Africa 62 and, in at least one case, outside
Africa. 63 It has also informed developments at the multilateral level,
both internationally and regionally. Most notably, it has provided the
basis for the expanded definition of refugee in the Draft Convention on
Territorial Asylum adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1977.64
61. See UNHCR Press Release, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Lauds Africa
Refugee Convention, at 40, for Saving Millions of Lives (June 18, 2014).
62. See generally Refugee Act of 1996, No. 13 (2006) THE LAWS OF KENYA, REVISED
EDITION § 291; Refugee Act, No. 3 of 1989 § 291 (1989) (Malawi); National Commission for
Refugees (Establishment, Etc.) Act (1989) Cap. N 21 LFN 2004 (Nigeria); Refugees Act
130 of 1998 § 3 (S. Afr.). With 46 ratifications, the OAU Refugee Convention has the third
largest number of parties of any OAU or AU treaty, save for the AU Constitutive Act and
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. For the status list of the OAU
Refugee Convention, see OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters, AFR.
UNION, https://au.int/treaties (last visited Mar. 29, 2020).
63. See generally Refugees Act, No. 26 of 1991 § 4(1)(c) (1991) (Belize). Mexico initially
incorporated, by general reference, the Cartagena Declaration, infra note 63, into its
domestic law through the Decree of Jul. 17, 1990, thereby indirectly adopting the
Declaration's expanded refugee definition, which is in turn based on the OAU Refugee
Convention's definition. See generally J-F. Durieux, Capturing the Central American
Refugee Phenomenon: Refugee Law-Making in Mexico and Belize, 4 INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
301 (1992) (discussing the inadequacy of traditional refugee definitions). In 2010, Mexico's
National Assembly adopted new legislation, drafted with the technical support of UNHCR:
The Law on Refugees, Complementary Protection, and Political Asylum. See Kausha
Luna, Mexico's Refugee Law, available at http://www.cis.org/Luna/Mexicos-Refugee-Law.
It was signed into law on Dec. 26, 2011. Article 13 of this law specifically incorporates the
broader refugee definition and the protections provided for asylum seekers in the
Cartagena Declaration using the language of the Declaration. Ley Sobre Refugiados,
Protecci6n Complementaria Y Asilo Politico, Articulol3, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n
[DOFI 27-1-2011, iltimas reformas DOF 30-10-2014 (Mex.).
64. U.N. Conference on Territorial Asylum, 1977 Draft UN Convention on Territorial
Asylum, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.78/12 (Apr. 21, 1977). In terms of Article 2(1): "Each
Contracting State may grant the benefits of this Convention to a person seeking asylum, if
he, being faced with a definite possibility of: (a) Persecution for reasons of race, colour,
national or ethnic origin, religion, nationality, kinship, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, including the struggle against colonialism and apartheid,
foreign occupation, alien domination and all forms of racism; or (b) Prosecution or
punishment for reasons directly related to the persecution set forth in (a); is unable or
unwilling to return to the country of his nationality, or, if he has no nationality, the
country of his former domicile or habitual residence." Id. at art. 2(1).
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In 1984, the Organization of American States followed suit and adopted
a similar definition in the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees.65 Some
commentators have noted that the OAU's expanded refugee definition
has provided practical guidance to the UNHCR. 66 In her study
examining African state practice and UNHCR's practice in carrying out
its refugee status determination function, Marina Sharpe has observed
that the UNHCR has adopted a wider refugee definition based on the
definitions in the OAU Refugee Convention and the Cartagena
Declaration.6 7 Thus, in practical terms, this has extended the UNHCR's
mandate to a variety of situations of forced displacement resulting from
conflict, indiscriminate violence, or public disorder.6 8
B. Reaffirming the Principle of Non-Refoulement
The principle of non-refoulement, as articulated in Article 33 of the
UN Refugee Convention, prohibits states from returning refugees to
territories where the life or freedom of the refugee may be threatened on
account of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular
social group or political opinion. 69 It is widely recognized as the
65. Adopted at the Colloquium on International Protection of Refugees and Displaced
Persons in Central America, Mexico and Panama, held in Cartagena, Colombia, Nov. 19-
22, 1984. See Eduardo Arboleda, The Cartagena Declaration of 1984 and its Similarities to
the 1969 Convention - A Comparative Perspective, INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 87, 94 (1995).
See also Sharpe, supra note 60, at 103.
66. See, e.g., Marina Sharpe, The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention and the Protection of
People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence in the Context of
Individual Refugee Status Determination, UNHCR 15-16 (2013), https://www.unhcr.org/
en-us/protection/globalconsult/50f9652e9/30-1969-oau-refugee-convention-protection-
people-fleeing-armed-conflict.html.
67. Id. at 15 ("In its RSD operations, UNHCR has adopted a wider refugee definition,
based on the definitions in the 1969 Convention and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration
on Refugees.").
68. Id. at 16 (citing UN High Commissioner for Refugees, MM (Iran) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department - Written Submission on Behalf of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Refugees, C5/2009/2479, at 10 (Aug. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c6aa7db2.html).
69. The principle is framed in Article 33 as follows: "(1) No Contracting State shall
expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. (2) The benefit of
the provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who,
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a
danger to the community of that country." UN Refugee Convention, supra note 10, at art.
33.
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cornerstone of international refugee protection. 70 The OAU Refugee
Convention not only strengthens the institution of asylum, but it also
strengthens the principle of non-refoulement.
The principle of non-refoulement is a major aspect of the concept of
asylum, and is enshrined in both international refugee treaties and
international human rights treaties.71 The formulation of the principle
in Article II, paragraph 3 of the OAU Refugee Convention draws on
Article 3, paragraph I of the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum. The
latter provides that "[n]o person referred to in article 1, paragraph 1,
shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier or, if he
[or she] has already entered the territory in which he seeks asylum,
expulsion or compulsory return to any state where he may be subjected
to persecution." 72 For its part, the OAU Refugee Convention
provides that:
No person shall be subjected by a Member State to
measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or
expulsion, which would compel him to return to or
remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or
liberty would be threatened for reasons set out in Article
I, paragraphs 1 and 2.73
There are three main reasons that the OAU Refugee Convention
strengthens the principle of non-refoulement. First, the OAU Refugee
Convention, unlike under the UN Refugee Convention, describes the
people to whom non-refoulement applies as "persons" and not
70. ELIHU LAUTERPACHT & DANIEL BETHLEHEM, REFUGEE PROTECTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw: UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
87-177 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003). See generally CORNELIS WOLFRAM WOUTERS,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE PROTECTION FROM REFOULEMENT (2009)
(exploring the basic right of every forcibly-displaced person to be protected from
refoulement).
71. Apart from the UN Refugee Convention and the OAU Refugee Convention, the
principle of non-refoulement is also enshrined in some human rights treaties:
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment of 1984, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on
the Rights of the Child, art. 6, 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, art. 16, Dec. 20,
2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3.
72. U.N. General Assembly, Declaration on Territorial Asylum, AIRES/2312(XXII) (14
Dec. 1967), art. 3(1), available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/3bO0fO5a2c.html.
73. OAU Refugee Convention, art. 11(3), supra note 8.
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"refugees" 7t -persons therefore do not need refugee status to be eligible
for non-refoulement under the OAU Refugee Convention. Consequently,
the OAU Refugee Convention's regime offers protection to a wider range
of persons than its UN counterpart, given its broadened refugee
definition. 75 Second, the OAU Refugee Convention expands non-
refoulement because it does not include a national security exception, as
is provided for under Article 33(2) of the UN Refugee Convention. 76 A
third, somewhat subtle, difference is between the text of Article 33,
paragraph 1 of the UN Refugee Convention and Article II, paragraph 3
of the OAU Refugee Convention. Whereas the former prohibits return to
territories where life or freedom would be threatened, the latter could be
interpreted as prohibiting return to territories where life, physical
integrity, and liberty would be threatened. Arguably, a prohibition on
return in the face of threats to physical integrity provides a wider ambit
of protection than a prohibition on return in the face of threats to life.7 7
Furthermore, consistent with its approach to strengthening the
principle of non-refoulement, the OAU Refugee Convention explicitly
enshrines voluntary repatriation in its Article V, paragraph 1, which
provides that "the essentially voluntary nature of repatriation shall be
respected in all cases and no refugee shall be repatriated against his
will." Functionally, the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition
of involuntary return or forced repatriation provide the same scope
of protection.
But the notion that the OAU Refugee Convention expands the
principle of non-refoulement needs to be taken with a caveat. Some
commentators have argued that the OAU Refugee Convention, like its
UN counterpart, allows expulsion, or refoulement, in limited
circumstances, except that the OAU Refugee Convention does so only
indirectly. 78And as Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam argue, even
74. W.J.E.M. van H6vell tot Westerflier, Africa and Refugees: The OAU Refugee
Convention in Theory and Practice, 7 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 172, 176 (1989).
75. Marina Sharpe, African Union Refugee Definition, RTs. IN EXILE PROGRAMME,
http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.orglafrican-union-refugee-
definition#sthash.vVieaCap.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
76. UN Refugee Convention, supra note 10, at art. 33(2).
77. See, e.g., Georges Abi-Saab, The Admission and Expulsion of Refugees with Special
Reference to Africa, 8 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 89, 90 (2000); Arboleda, supra note 39, at 185;
Rachel Murray, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons and Human Rights: The
African System, 24 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 56, 57 (2005); George Okoth-Obbo, The
OAU/UNHCR Symposium on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in Africa -
A Review Article, INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 274, 287-89 (1995); Wood, supra note 23 (discussing
some of the innovative aspects of the OAU Refugee Convention).
78. Rose M. D'Sa, The African Refugee Problem: Relevant International Conventions
and Recent Activities of the Organization of African Unity, 31 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 378, 388
(1984).
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under the UN Refugee Convention, non-refoulement applies equally to
refugees and asylum seekers, "at least during an initial period and in
appropriate circumstances, for otherwise there would be no effective
protection."7 9 In this respect, it is necessary to recall the difference
between these two classes of persons. On the one hand, a refugee is
someone who factually fulfils the requirements of the refugee definition
set out in the UN Refugee Convention or the OAU Refugee Convention,
as the case may be.80 The defining factor is not the recognition by the
host state, but rather the fact of fulfilling the requirements.8 1 On the
other hand, an asylum seeker is someone who claims to be a refugee but
whose claim has not been definitively evaluated. Further, while it is
true that the OAU Refugee Convention does not include a national
security exception, sections (f) and (g) of its Article I, paragraph
undercut claims that this exclusion reduces refoulement. Under these
provisions, the application of the Convention-and thus the protection
afforded by non-refoulement-ceases if the person concerned commits a
serious nonpolitical crime outside the country of refuge after admission
as a refugee or seriously infringes the Convention's purposes and
objectives. In this sense, therefore, the OAU Refugee Convention's
expanded principle of non-refoulement is not as absolute as some
scholars make it out to be. 82
C. Exploring the Right to Asylum
It is widely acknowledged that the UN Refugee Convention does not
establish a right to asylum for the individual, and that no other
international instrument of universal scope recognizes such a right. The
Convention lays out an obligation upon the States Parties not to return
asylum seekers admitted to their territories to places where their lives
or freedom may be in danger (the principle of non-refoulement) but does
not oblige them to admit refugees. The duty placed upon States Parties,
79. GuY S. GOODWIN-GIL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 232
(3d ed. 2007).
80. OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 8, art. I; UN Convention Refugee Convention,
supra note 10, art. 1(A)(2); see also UNHCR Handbook, supra note 46, at paras. 195-05
(setting out the principles and methods for establishing the facts when determining
refugee status).
81. See Saidi v Minister of Home Affairs 2018 (4) SA 333 (CC) at para. 34 (S. Afr.)
(quoting Judge Pinto de Albuquerque of the European Court of Human Rights in Hirsi
Jamaa v Italy [GC], No. 27765/09, ECHR 2012, at 63: "[a] person does not become a
refugee because of recognition, but is recognised because he or she is a refugee.")
82. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 77.
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implied in Articles 1 and 33 of the UN Refugee Convention, is only to
grant access to asylum procedures to asylum seekers.8 3
The UN General Assembly adopted the UN Refugee Convention
three years after the 1948 adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR).84 Article 14, paragraph 1 of the UDHR provides
for the right of individuals to seek and enjoy asylum, but it does not
positively oblige states to provide it. The UDHR contains no express
provision that stipulates an obligation upon states to grant asylum.
Recalling the legislative history of article 14, paragraph 1 Roman Boed
has noted that:
The drafting history of Article 14(1), however, reveals
that the drafters of the Declaration contemplated-but
ultimately declined to adopt-any significant innovation
in the law of asylum. The original draft of Article 14
provided that, "[e]veryone has the right to seek and to be
granted, in other countries, asylum from persecution."
This generous provision would have vested individuals
with the right to asylum vis-A-vis the state of refuge.8 5
Some sixteen years after the adoption of the UN Refugee
Convention, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on
Territorial Asylum, which also did not recognize an individual right to
asylum.86 No other UN instrument has codified the right. Consequently,
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, among the leading authorities on the
subject, have made the categorical and widely shared conclusion that,
based on state practice, there is no right to asylum. 8 7 Nevertheless,
Ousmane Goundiam has advanced the case for a right to asylum on the
basis that asylum is "the first and most fundamental of the refugee's
83. The view that the UN Refugee Convention and the Refugee Protocol do not provide
a right to be granted asylum is shared by most scholars and writers and has not been
seriously challenged. See, e.g., Roman Boed, The State of the Right of Asylum in
International Law, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 11 (1994). See also David A. Martin,
Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1247, 1255 (1990) (noting that classically the right to asylum under international law
belonged to the States and not to individuals).
84. GA. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
85. Boed, supra note 83, at 9.
86. See G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), Declaration on Territorial Asylum (Dec. 14, 1967).
87. See GOODwiN-GILL & McADAM, supra note 79, at 132; see also Maria-Teresa Gil-
Bazo, Asylum as a General Principle of International Law, 27 INT'L J. REFUGEE. L. 3, 5-6
(2015); Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, Refugee Status, Subsidiary Protection, and the Right to be
Granted Asylum Under EC Law, UNHCR 7 (Nov. 2006), https://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/research/working/455993882/refugee-status-subsidiary-protection-right-granted-
asylum-under-ec-law.html.
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needs and to grant him this constitutes the preliminary condition for
him to have all the other rights."88
The OAU Refugee Convention does not depart from the established
consensus that the so-called right to asylum is really the right of
refugees to petition States to grant them asylum if the States wish to do
so, as an exercise of their sovereign choice. Thus, the OAU Refugee
Convention provides that:
Member States of the OAU shall use their best
endeavors consistent with their respective legislation to
receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those
refugees who, for well-founded reasons, are unable or
unwilling to return to their country of origin or
nationality.89
In essence, the OAU Refugee Convention merely urges States to
grant asylum but does not create a right enforceable by the individual
against the State. The appeal to States to "[use] their best endeavors"
suggests that it merely grants a permissive right on the part of the
State rather than a positive, enforceable right on the part of the
individual. Hence, Abdulqawi Yusuf observed that the OAU Refugee
Convention "strengthens the institution of asylum and broadens the
scope of the 1951 Convention in this respect by providing for the 'right
to grant asylum."' 90 Nevertheless, Cristiano D'Orsi has argued that this
provision serves as "a further inroad into the traditional international
law perspective which has tended to regard asylum as an exclusive right
of the sovereign State, and certainly not as a right to be enforced by an
individual against a State."9 1
88. See Goundiam, supra note 60, at 9.
89. OAU Refugee Convention, art. II(1), supra note 8.
90. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, The Public Law of Africa and International Law: Broadening
the Scope of Application of International Rules and Enriching Them for Intra-Africa
Purposes, in SHIELDING HUMANITY: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF JUDGE
ABDUL G. KOROMA 513, 518 (Charles C. Jalloh & Olufemi Elias eds., 2015). Hofmann
makes a similar observation; see Hofmann, supra note 60, at 34.
91. See CRISTIANO D'ORSI, ASYLUM-SEEKER AND REFUGEE PROTECTION IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 33-40 (2015). The argument that the individual possesses a right to
asylum, which the State must grant as a matter of duty, has a long history. See HUGO
GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 218 (A.C. Campbell trans. 2001) (arguing that
the right to asylum is a natural right open to victims of unmerited persecution and that
states have a corresponding duty to grant asylum). Of course, such a right might be
enforceable by the individual if codified in the domestic legislation of the host State, and if
the individual is already on its territory and able to process an asylum application. See
Onayemi & Elias, supra note 57, at 596 ("It can be favorably argued that there are
prospects under Article 2(1) for the right to asylum to be enforced by an individual against
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While the OAU Refugee Convention does not enshrine a positive
individual right to asylum, it does characterize the grant of asylum as a
"peaceful and humanitarian act" that "shall not be regarded as an
unfriendly act by any Member State."92 Most African s have generally
respected this peaceful and humanitarian character of asylum, even if
the levels of refugee protection in recent years have declined due to lack
of-or limited-resources, and other challenges faced by these States.
While, in practical terms, this may not be different from the treatment
extended under the UN Refugee Convention, the inclusion of this
element in the OAU Refugee Convention provides an added
consideration to the way States treat asylum seekers. This is
particularly relevant with respect to the few African States that are
parties to the OAU Refugee Convention, but not to the UN Refugee
Convention. 93
The first, and so far only, international instrument to enshrine an
individual right to asylum is the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights (African Charter). 94 Article 12, paragraph 3 of the
African Charter provides that "[e]very individual shall have the right,
when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in
accordance with the law of those countries and international
conventions." Although the incremental advances made by the OAU
Refugee Convention appear to have culminated in the codification of a
right to asylum in the African Charter, stricter analysis of this provision
paints a mixed picture. The right "to seek and obtain" asylum,
articulated in Article 12, paragraph 3 of the African Charter, suggests a
deliberate intention by the drafters to incorporate the language that
was rejected by the drafters of Article 14, paragraph 1 of the UDHR ("to
seek and be granted").9 5 On the one hand, the right of an individual who
is suffering persecution to seek asylum is not controversial, nor open to
debate, since it is an aspect of the right of the individual to leave any
country, including their own. On the other hand, the notion of a right to
"obtain" asylum remains untenable. As noted earlier, there is no
corresponding obligation under general international law on states to
admit refugees, and this discretionary power has not been questioned or
a State in which the 1969 Convention has been transformed into, or is otherwise
applicable, as domestic law."). See Rwelamira, supra note 43, at 170.
92. OAU Refugee Convention, art. 11(2), supra note 8.
93. These states are Comoros, Libya, and Mauritius- See States Parties to the
Convention and Protocol, UNHCR, https://www.unhre.org/en-us/protection/basic/
3 b 7 3 b 0 d63/states-parties-1951-Convention-relating-to-status-of-refugees (last visited Mar.
29, 2020).
94. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
95. See Boed, supra note 83. See also A. VERDOODT, NAISSANCE ET SIGNIFICATION DE LA
DECLARATION UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 155-56 (1964).
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diminished by the UDHR, the UN Refugee Convention, or subsequent
international instruments. 96 Article 12, paragraph 3 of the African
Charter itself recognizes that the alleged right to seek and obtain
asylum in other countries is subject to the "law of those countries and
international conventions."97 This suggests the precedence of the OAU
Refugee Convention and the UN Refugee Convention insofar as a
State's right to grant asylum, or not, is concerned. Thus far, there has
been only one case concerning asylum before the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights, and none as yet before the African Court
on Human and Peoples' Rights.9 8 Subsequent African state practice
suggests that the grant of asylum remains within the exclusive
discretion of States. Outside the African regional refugee regime, a
limited right to asylum has evolved under the European Convention on
Human Rights 99 for persons subject to deportation or extradition
proceedings in countries that are parties to the Convention.100
96. See, e.g., OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 8; Arboleda, supra note 65.
97. African Charter, supra note 94, art. 12(3).
98. In Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture and Association Internationale des
Juristes Ddmocrates v. Rwanda, the African Commission stated, in relation to Article
12(3), only that the article "should be read as including a general protection of all those
who are subject to persecution, that they may seek refuge in another State." See African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Tenth Annual Report, 27/89-46/90-49/91-
99/93 (Oct. 1996), https://www.refworld.org/cases,ACHPR,51b6f4374.html.
99. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 22.
100. See David Scott Nance, The Individual Right to Asylum Under Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, 3 MICH. J. INT'L L. 477, 484-88 (1982) (discussing
the emergence of a variant of an individual right to be granted asylum, albeit under
limited conditions, in a series of decisions by the European Commission of Human Rights
beginning in 1961. Nance traces the evolution of a doctrine of nondeportation, as a limited
variant to the right to asylum, and its application by the Commission in a number of cases.
The limiting conditions identified by the Commission are that "(a) the applicant is to be
deported to a country known for its denial of human rights, for example where it is clear
that he or she will be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment; and (b) the
circumstances relating to the applicant be "exceptional", i.e. that upon examination of the
relevant fact situations, the Commission comes to the conclusion that there are "serious
reasons to believe that the person concerned will be subjected, in the State to which he is
to be sent, to treatment which is in violation of Article 3."). In Nance's reading, the essence
of the doctrine of nondeportation under Article 3 is that it diverges from what might be
expected of a full-fledged right of asylum in two senses. First, it can arise only in
situations in which the individual has already entered the country in which he or she
seeks asylum; second, the right depends not on the conditions from which an individual
has fled, but on the anticipated treatment the individual will be subjected to if returned to
the country of origin.
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D. Explaining the Other Aspects: Burden-Sharing, Temporary
Protection, and Voluntary Repatriation
Finally, three other interrelated normative innovations in the
international refugee law regime merit brief mention here. First, Article
II, paragraph 4 of the OAU Refugee Convention introduced the concept
of burden-sharing, described as "a very early form of responsibility-
sharing." 101 In my view, the notion of burden-sharing in this context
should be understood to include regional resettlement of refugees,
financial support, and sharing political responsibility. Article II,
paragraph 4 of the OAU Refugee Convention provides that:
[W]here a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to
grant asylum to refugees, such Member State may
appeal directly to other Member States and through the
OAU, and such other Member States shall in the spirit
of African solidarity and international cooperation take
appropriate measures to lighten the burden of the
Member State granting asylum. 102
Notice that the language of this provision mentions "difficulty in
continuing to grant asylum." This suggests a requirement that asylum
should have already been granted in each individual case.
The apogee of burden-sharing occurred during the 1970s and
1980s, with the influx of refugees from apartheid South Africa and other
southern African countries still engaged in national liberation struggles,
into other African countries. 103 Although most of these refugees sought
asylum in the neighboring independent States within the southern
African region (such as Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zambia),
other States farther afield (including Tanzania in East Africa and
Nigeria in West Africa) took in their share of these refugees and
provided financial and material assistance as well. Because of this mass
migration, following the entry into force of the OAU Refugee Convention
in 1974, the OAU established the Refugees, Displaced Persons, and
Humanitarian Affairs Division as a unit within the OAU General
Secretariat with the responsibility of coordinating the organization's
101. Sharpe, supra note 60, at 107.
102. OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 8, art. 11(4).
103. See James Schneider, The Refugee Crisis in Southern and Central Africa, 4 GLOBAL
DIALOGUE 1 (1999) (noting that as recently as the 1980s countries such as South Africa,
Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia remained primary source countries for refugees),
available at https://sites.tufts.edu/jha.
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policies with Member States on this and other issues. 104 Thus, on paper,
if not in practice, African States had agreed on an expanded approach to
the application of the principles of non-refoulement and burden-sharing
before other countries elsewhere. However, as has been noted by Jean-
Francois Durieux and Agnbs Hurwitz, in recent times, each of these
possible methods of burden-sharing has since been constrained in
practice by the limited resources of the African States. 05
A contemporary situation that presents a challenge to the principle
of burden-sharing is the refugee flows from the conflict in South Sudan,
Africa's newest country, into other neighboring East African countries.
As was recently acknowledged in a statement by the UNHCR, eight
months after fresh violence erupted in South Sudan, a famine produced
by the vicious combination of fighting and drought has been driving the
world's fastest growing refugee crisis.106 Estimates of people displaced
from South Sudan into the surrounding States in the last two-and-a-
half years stand at about 1.6 million, with almost half of these persons
crossing into the northern part of Uganda, and the rest fleeing into
Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the
Central African Republic. 0 7 This alarming rate of displacement not only
represents an impossible burden on a poor region, which is quickly
running short of resources to cope with the problem, but it also erases
104. See OAU Council of Ministers Resolution on the Bureau for the Placement and
Education of African Refugees, CMJRes. 346 (XXIII) (June 6-15, 1974). See also Sharpe,
supra note 11, at 71-74 (discussing the legislative history of the Bureau for the Placement
and Education of African Refugees, which was integrated into the OAU General
Secretariat as the Refugees, Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Affairs Division). The
restructuring of the Bureau in 1974 also included formalizing the role of the OAU's
Liberation Committee, which was responsible for coordinating the OAU's support for the
various national liberation movements in Southern Africa, in providing humanitarian
assistance to refugees fleeing the apartheid and minority-ruled colonial regimes in
the region.
105. See Jean-Francois Durieux & Agn~s Hurwitz, How Many is Too Many? African and
European Legal Responses to Mass Influxes of Refugees, 47 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 105, 128-29
(2004). The issue of financial constraints as a critical factor in the demand for burden-
sharing and responsibility-sharing in international refugee protection was at the heart of
discussions during the first-ever UN General Assembly High-Level Summit on Addressing
Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants held on Sept. 19, 2016 in New York. See
generally Volker Turk & Madeline Garlick, From Burdens and Responsibilities to
Opportunities: The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global Compact on
Refugees, 28 INT'L J. REFUGEE L 656 (2016) (discussing regional responsibility-sharing,
including in Africa).
106. UNHCR Press Release, South Sudan's Refugee Crisis Now the World's Fastest
Growing, Uganda and Region in Critical Need of Help (Mar. 17, 2017).
107. Id.
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any possibility of implementing among these States the principle of
burden-sharing provided for in the OAU Refugee Convention. 108
Second, there is the notion of temporary protection articulated in
the OAU Refugee Convention. Article II, paragraph 5 provides that:
"Where a refugee has not received the right to reside in
any country of asylum, he may be granted temporary
residence in any country of asylum in which he first
presented himself as a refugee pending arrangement for
his resettlement in accordance with the preceding
paragraph." 109
At first reading, this provision seems to imply only temporary
protection of a limited nature. 110 In my view, the more correct
interpretation, however, is that the provision is intended to apply to
persons who have been recognized as refugees, but for one reason or
another have not been granted the right of residence for any duration at
all. Thus, the OAU Refugee Convention does not operate to limit State
obligations towards refugees. Rather, it spreads the obligations to other
States, so that when a person is recognized as a refugee and granted
asylum in one African country, and is later resettled in another African
country, the resettlement simply continues her refugee status in the
new country. The idea here is to remedy situations in which a refugee
may have been granted asylum, but not an accompanying right of
residence. It is the residence in the first country that is temporary, and
not the refugee status and protection itself. There is thus a close link
between temporary protection and burden-sharing. But temporary
protection need not mean limited protection.
The third issue concerns voluntary repatriation, which is rendered
more explicitly in the OAU Refugee Convention than in the UN Refugee
Convention. The explicit prohibition on forced repatriation in this
provision has been described as "a powerful statement of principle" and
as an early expression of a principle that has since become "the
108. Id.
109. OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 8, art. 11(5),
110. Bonaventure Rutinwa, Prima Fade Status and Refugee Protection 22 (New Issues
in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 69, 2002) (citing an unpublished study by the
Centre for Refugee Research Unit, York University, Canada, The Temporary Protection of
Refugees: A Solution-Oriented and Rights Regarding Approach, (1996), which concludes
that "[the] debate about temporary versus permanent refugee protection has no real
currency in the [Global] South, where protection has almost always been assumed to be
temporary, even if it lasted for a long time. Protection has usually been provided by
neighboring countries with the clear understanding that the refugees would eventually
return home.").
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cornerstone of the international regime for refugee protection.""n As
noted earlier, the prohibition of involuntary repatriation is, in its effect,
functionally equivalent to the principle of non-refoulement.
At the same time, however, instances of forced repatriation or
expulsions of refugees have occasionally punctuated intra-African
political relations. In some cases, while governments have officially
committed themselves to only voluntary repatriation, they have
simultaneously carried out forced ejections of refugees under the pretext
of security concerns, as happened in 1993 when the Kenyan government
forcibly repatriated over one thousand Somali refugees from Kenyan
refugee camps. 112 In other cases, the ejection of refugees can be a matter
of formal policy. This was seen in July 1999, when Zambia ordered the
immediate deportation of all nationals of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, which included many refugees.1 1 8 Similarly, Angolan refugees in
Namibia and Rwandan refugees in Zimbabwe were reclassified as
"illegal immigrants" and thus subject to exclusion of refugee status,
enabling refoulement and expulsion. 114 This was also the justification for
the forced repatriation of over five thousand Rwandan refugees from
Tanzania in 2006, despite the fact that Tanzania had previously either
recognized or naturalized most of these citizens. 115
On other occasions, refugees have "voluntarily" returned because of
conditions created deliberately to leave them with no option but to give
up their refugee status and return to their countries of origin. For
example, Tanzanian refugee camps apparently denied Burundian
refugees food, as did Ugandan camps harboring Sudanese refugees.1 16
111. See Durieux & Hurwitz, supra note 105, at 130. It is significant that subsequent
state practice elsewhere outside Africa has followed this principle. See, e.g., Bilateral
Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees, Afg.-Pak., art. III, Apr. 14, 1988, 27 ILM
585.
112. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
283 (2005).
113. Id. at 284.
114. Id. at 285.
115. Earlier, in 1980, Tanzania had naturalized about 36,000 Rwandan refugees who
had been living in the country for several years, in some cases for generations. See
Aderanti Adepoju, Refugees in Africa: Problems and Prospects 11 (1984), Paper presented
at the Symposium on Assistance to Refugees - Alternative Viewpoints, Oxford, United
Kingdom on March 27-31, 1984.
116. See HATHAWAY, supra note 112, at 288-89 (citing the cases of Burundian refugees
and Sudanese refugees in Tanzania and Uganda, respectively, who were reported to be
voluntarily repatriating but were actually leaving because of dramatic reductions in their
food rations, coupled with being denied the right to earn a living through economic
activity). See generally Bonaventure Rutinwa, The End of Asylum? The Changing Nature
of Refugee Politics in Africa (New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 5, 1999).
More recent threats to forcibly expel refugees include those by the Kenyan government in
respect of Somali refugees on account of security concerns (May, 2016) and by the
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This has led observers, such as Cristiano D'Orsi, to claim that voluntary
repatriation is a principle honored more in its breach than in its
observance in Africa. 117 While there is some truth in this claim, which
reflects a declining commitment toward asylum and refugee protection
in some countries, compliance with the obligation set out in Article 5,
paragraph 1) of the OAU Refugee Convention remains the rule, rather
than the exception.
Although the gap between law and practice-or legal and practical
protection-under the Convention in Africa is often wide,118 the OAU
has had three major impacts on international legal developments and
practice: the adoption in practice of the OAU refugee definition by
multilateral organizations, provision of inspirational guidance in
multilateral regional treaties, and the use of nonexclusive binding
language. First, the principles contained in the OAU Refugee
Convention have been adopted by various agencies of the UN. The
UNHCR's execution of its mandate in Africa has, for example, employed
refugee protection policies embedded in the UN Refugee Convention, the
Refugee Protocol, and the OAU Refugee Convention.11 9 Significantly,
the UNHCR's Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's
Programme concluded that the definition of a refugee under the UN
Refugee Convention should be broadened to take account of mass
displacement, and suggested using the exact wording of Article 1(2) of
the OAU Refugee Convention (though the latter convention is not
directly attributed). 120 Moreover, the OAU Refugee Convention has also
guided the activities of other relevant UN agencies, such as the World
Health Organization and World Food Programme. 121
Second, the OAU Refugee Convention has provided the inspiration
for another kind of regional instrument: 122 The 1984 Cartagena
Ugandan government with respect to Burundian refugees following a claim by Burundian
authorities that the country was safe after months of civil unrest (Feb., 2017). Both the
Kenyan and Ugandan governments subsequently retreated and neither threat was carried
out.
117. See generally Cristiano d'Orsi, Sub-Saharan Africa: Is a New Special Regional
Refugee Law Regime Emerging?, 68 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 1057 (2008) (analyzing aspects
of the present refugee law regime in Sub-Saharan Africa in order to assess how the
institution of asylum is legally perceived and applied).
118. See Okoth-Obbo, supra note 44, at 85; Wood, supra note 23, at 579.
119. See Sharpe, supra note 66 at 15.
120. See YASSIN EL-AYouTY & I WILLIAM ZARTMAN, THE OAU AFTER TwENTY YEARS 224
(1984). See also Sharpe, supra note 60, at 103.
121. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Assistance to
Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons, U.N. Doc. A/65/324 (Aug. 24, 2010).
122. See, e.g., Arboleda, supra note 39, at 194 (discussing the OAU Convention's role in
expanding the meaning of 'refugee' amongst African States). Moreover, the Group of Latin
American countries in the UN officially recognized the influence of the OAU Refugee
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Declaration on Refugees, which ten Latin American countries created to
address the situation of refugees in the Central American region. 123 As
already noted, Article I, paragraph 2 of the OAU Refugee Convention
expands the UN Refugee Convention definition by adding that the term
refugee shall also apply to:
[Every] person who, owing to external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously
disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his
country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his
[or her] place of habitual residence in order to seek
refuge in another place outside his country of origin or
nationality.
Article III, paragraph 3 of the Cartagena Declaration similarly states
that in addition to the elements contained in the 1951 UN Refugee
Convention and the 1967 Refugee Protocol, the definition or concept of a
refugee recommended for use in the region is one that includes
"[persons] who have fled their country because their lives, security or
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign
aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or
other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order." In
fact, the Cartagena Declaration's definition goes further than that of the
OAU's, by specifying more elements. Although not a binding treaty, the
Declaration has since been incorporated in the national law and state
practice of sixteen countries. 124
Convention's definition in a submission to the Working Group on Solutions and Protection
of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme in 1991. See United
Nations High Comm'r for Refugees, Report of the Working Group on Solutions and
Protection to the Forty-Second Session of the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme, $¶ 23-26 (Aug. 12, 1991).
123. The Cartagena Declaration was elaborated and adopted by delegates from the
following countries: Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela. Cartagena Declaration. It was reaffirmed by
the San Jose Declaration on Refugees and Displaced Persons, adopted by the Colloquium
on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Panama, and Mexico held
on Dec. 7, 1994. San Jose Declaration on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Dec. 7, 1994,
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a54bc3fd.html. The San Jose Declaration extends the
scope of the application of the Cartagena Declaration to internally displaced persons.
124. These countries are Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and
Uruguay. See Regional Definition of Refugee (Cartagena), Table 1: Latin American
Countries that Have Incorporated it into their National Legislation, available at
https:/acnur.orgfffleadmin/Documentos/Proteccion/BuenasPracticas/11261.pdf. See also
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Last, there is one remarkable feature of the OAU Refugee
Convention to which commentators have not generally drawn attention:
the use of nonexclusive, binding language. 125 For example, the
principles of asylum, non-refoulement, burden-sharing, and non-
discrimination are all broadly addressed to "OAU Member States," and
not specifically or restrictively to "Signatory States," although the latter
term is used in other provisions of the Convention.1 26 This paper argues
that the usage of these different terms was not accidental, but a
deliberate choice by the drafters. This choice was likely driven by the
optimistic belief at the time that all OAU Member States would, in time
and as a matter of course, become parties to the OAU Refugee
Convention, as a regional instrument dealing with a problem of critical
significance for the African continent. The fact that today the OAU
Refugee Convention has one of the highest number of parties of all OAU
treaties, next only to the AU Constitutive Act and the African Charter,
is a validation of the early desire of African states to expand certain
aspects of existing international law to address their specific needs and
problems.
South Africa embraced this desire when it acceded to the OAU
Refugee Convention on December 15, 1995.127 The remainder of this
discussion examines the extent to which South Africa's legislative
policies, administrative practices, and judicial decision making respect
the objectives and obligations enshrined not only in the OAU Refugee
Convention, but also in the UN Refugee Convention, which it acceded to
within a month of its accession to the former OAU Refugee
Convention. 128
Cathryn Costello, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
UNHCR LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY RES. SERIES, July 2017, at 11 n. 57.
125. Article 4 enshrines the general principle of equality and non-discrimination, which
is a fundamental element of international human rights law, in the application of the
Convention to refugees. It provides: "Member States undertake to apply the provisions of
this Convention to all refugees without discrimination as to race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion." OAU Refugee Convention,
supra note 8, art. 4.
126. Undoubtedly, the drafters of the OAU Refugee Convention would have been aware
that the obligations set out in the treaty would only bind the parties to it. However, given
the political context in which the treaty evolved, there was probably a desire that all
members of the organization, including non-signatory states, embrace the new principles
set out in it as a shared consensus on the protection of refugees in the new,
postcolonial Africa.
127. D'Orsi, supra note 8, at 223 n. 13.
128. Refugee Protocol, supra note 10.
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II. REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION PROCEDURES
UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
In this Part, we examine the refugee status determination
procedures under two periods. The first period ran from April 1994,
when the new post-apartheid government was installed, and lasted
until March 2000. As noted above, although the Refugees Act was
signed into law during this period, on November 20, 1998, it did not
come into operation until April 1, 2000.129 The second period follows the
entry into force of the Refugees Act, and continues through
to the present.
A. Refugee Status Determination Procedure from 1994 to 2000
Early in the first period, in mid-April 1994, the Department of
Home Affairs developed guidelines for its operational officers for the
refugee status determination of Mozambicans in South Africa. Within
six months, by the end of September 1994, the scope and application of
these administrative arrangements had been extended to all persons
seeking refugee status in South Africa.13 0 However, the first period was
marked by the fact that South Africa did not have domestic legislation
for the protection of refugees and asylum seekers. It relied on its
immigration law, with the Aliens Control Act as the key legislation. For
the greater part of the first period, therefore, South Africa managed the
emerging refugee problem in the country without a refugee regime.
Jonathan Klaaren and Christopher Sprigman have critically
investigated the procedures for refugee determination status that were
in force during the first period mentioned above. They have termed this
administrative system as a "centralized bureaucratic model," 131 which
they contrast with the system that was eventually adopted under the
Refugees Act. They characterize the latter system as a "decentralized
hearing-based model," which allows for individualized status
determination hearings that afford the applicant, at some level, the
opportunity for legal representation. 132 We do not propose to reassess
129. See supra note 15.
130. See Jonathan KIaaren & Christopher Sprigman, Refugee Status Determination
Procedures in South African Law, in ADvANCING REFUGEE PROTECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA
61, 62 nn. 5-6 (Jeff Handmaker, Lee Anne de la Hunt & Jonathan Klaaren eds., 2008).
131. Id. at 62-73 (discussing in comprehensive detail the refugee status determination
procedures during the period 1994-2000, and the provisions of the Refugees Act which had
just become operational but had not yet been interpreted by the courts or administrative
tribunals dealing with refugee status determination claims).
132. Id. at 73-82.
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Klaaren's and Sprigman's analysis in any detail. We generally share
their position with respect to the discussion on the centralized
bureaucratic procedures and administrative arrangements prior to the
enactment of the Refugees Act, which we describe briefly below.
Prior to adopting its domestic refugee legislation, asylum seekers in
South Africa were dealt with only in terms of the Aliens Control Act,
which provided for the control of the admission of persons to, their
residence in, and their departure from South Africa, but did not provide
for the recognition or protection of refugees.1 33 Hicks has argued that
the Aliens Control Act overzealously conferred power to immigration
officers to find, detain, and repatriate undocumented immigrants and
that this power was subsequently abused by immigration authorities by
infringing upon the rights of immigrants.1 34
The Aliens Control Act provided that, in the first instance, all
persons who were not citizens of South Africa were aliens.1 35 There was
a general prohibition on foreigners entering or remaining in South
Africa with a view to permanent residence or temporary residence
without the necessary immigration permit or temporary residence
permit.1 36 Foreigners who had been removed from the country under a
warrant in terms of sections 45, 46 or 47 of the Aliens Control Act as
undesirable inhabitants due to convictions for certain designated
offenses or in the public interest were prohibited from reentering or
remaining in South Africa. 137
As we have stated above, the Aliens Control Act did not provide for
the recognition or protection of refugees. It was not long after the
adoption of the final Constitution of South Africa in 1996 that the
constitutionality of the Aliens Control Act was put under the spotlight
by legal commentators and scholars. The legislation was regarded as a
133. The Aliens Control Act was, in its own terms, described as "Act to provide for the
control of the admission of persons to, their residence in, and their departure from, the
Republic; and for matters incidental therewith." None of its dispositive provisions
contained any reference to asylum seekers or refugees or to the recognition and protection
of the rights of asylum seekers and refugees. See Aurelia Wa Kabwe-Segatti, Reforming
Immigration Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: From the Aliens Control Act of 1991 to
the Immigration Act of 2002, in TEN YEARS OF DEMocRATIc SOUTH AFRIcA: TRANSITION
ACCOMPLISHED? 171, 177 (Aurelia Wa Kabwe-Segatti, Nicolas Pejout & Philippe
Guillaume eds., 2006) (arguing that closer scrutiny reveals that the 1991 legislation was
meant to tackle domestic issues rather than to be a long-term management instrument for
regional migrations).
134. See Thomas F. Hicks, The Constitution, Aliens Control Act, and Xenophobia: The
Struggle to Protect South Africa's Pariah-The Undocumented Immigrant, 7 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 393, 408-09 (1999).
135. Aliens Control Act of 1991 § 1 (S. Afr.).
136. Id. § 23.
137. Id. § 49.
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vestige of the apartheid era, and was criticized as symbolizing the racist
sentiments inherent in the past society and which, in the post-apartheid
era, institutionalized the practice of favoring whites over non-whites in
immigration-related issues and encouraged xenophobia. 138 Klaaren and
Sprigman have noted that the initial post-apartheid developments
regarding refugee protection were at the level of international law,
when on September 6, 1993 South Africa signed a Basic Agreement with
UNHCR to govern the role of the refugee agency in the country.13 9 This
was followed by the Tripartite Agreement between South Africa,
Mozambique, and UNHCR on October 15, 1993, under which the South
African government belatedly granted "group refugee status" to
Mozambican nationals in South Africa. 140 Following this development,
the Department of Home Affairs established procedures and a
bureaucratic structure, the Refugee Affairs Unit, to manage refugee
status determination for all applicants apart from the Mozambican
nationals. This marked the first instance in which international refugee
status became formally applicable to asylum seekers in South Africa.1 41
Consequently, a policy designed to recognize former Mozambican
refugees for purposes of repatriation became the basis of the asylum
procedure until the entry into force of the Refugees Act on April 1, 2000.
Under the pre-2000 procedure, the application for asylum was
made to an immigration officer who referred the application to the
Refugee Affairs Standing Committee (Standing Committee). 142 The
Standing Committee received and considered all applications. In its
determination process, it relied on the information provided by the
immigration officer who interviewed the asylum seeker. 143 The Standing
Committee advised the applicant of the outcome of the application
138. Hicks, supra note 134, at 394 n. 5 (citing HUM. RTs. WATCH, "PROHIBITED
PERSONS:" ABUSE OF UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, AND REFUGEES IN
SOUTH AFRICA, at app. A6 (1998)); see also Jonathan Crush & David A. McDonald,
Introduction to Special Issue: Evaluating South African Immigration Policy After
Apartheid, 48 AFR. TODAY 1, 1 (2001)).
139. Klaaren & Sprigman, supra note 130, at 62. Under the Basic Agreement South
Africa agreed to use the refugee definitions in the UN Refugee Convention and OAU
Refugee Convention.
140. See Tripartite Agreement between South Africa, Mozambique, and UNHCR, art.
1(a). The objective of the Basic Agreement between South Africa and UNHCR of 1993 was
to facilitate the repatriation of Mozambican refugees.
141. Klaaren & Sprigman, supra note 130, at 62.
142. The Standing Committee and the Appeal Board for Refugee Affairs were
established following the Basic Agreement between South Africa and UNHCR; id.
143. The Department of Home Affairs established four Regional Offices of Refugee
Affairs where specially trained immigration officers conducted interviews. These offices
were located in the country's four major cities: Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg,
and Pretoria.
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through an immigration officer. The Standing Committee was required
to provide all asylum seekers with reasons, in writing, for any adverse
decisions. 144 In the event of an unsuccessful application, the applicant
could appeal to the Appeal Board for Refugee Affairs (Appeal Board). 145
While the decisions of the Standing Committee and the Appeal Board
were pending, and while the application was being finalized, the asylum
seeker was entitled to study or work in South Africa.
In Somali Association of South Africa v. Limpopo Department of
Economic Development Environment and Tourism, the court held that
asylum seekers in South Africa also have the right to open businesses in
South Africa and that, accordingly, the State must allow asylum seekers
to apply for and renew business permits and licenses. 146 The Court also
held that it was unlawful for the government to close permitted
businesses owned by asylum seekers. 147
In Kabuika v. Minister of Home Affairs, 148 asylum seekers from
Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) sought an interim
interdict that would direct the Minister of Home Affairs to allow them to
remain in South Africa pending a judicial review of the decisions by the
Standing Committee and the Refugee Board. 149 The Court examined the
findings of the Standing Committee and the Board and found, after
considering reports from Amnesty International and other international
bodies concerning the state of affairs in the former Zaire, that the
applicants had shown, at the very least, a prima facie right to relief and
that they had a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm should
they be forced to leave South Africa. 150 The Court found that the
144. Until December 1996, the Standing Committee refused to provide reasons for
rejections. But in a case brought before the Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division of the
High Court, an order by consent was granted which required the Standing Committee to
provide reasons in writing for any adverse decision. See Pembele v. Appeal Board for
Refugee Affairs (CC) (S. Afr.).
145. See supra note 143. The purpose of the Appeal Board for Refugee Affairs was to
consider all appeals made against the decision of the Standing Committee for Refugee
Affairs. A chairperson of the Appeal Board was appointed on Sept. 6, 1995 as its sole
member. The Refugees Act of 1998 established a new Refugee Appeal Board under section
12(1). The Refugee Appeal Board consists of a chairperson and at least two other members,
and its mandate is set out in section 14(1).
146. Somali Association of South Africa v. Limpopo Department of Economic
Development Environment and Tourism 2015 (1) SA 151 (SCA) at para. 46(2)(a)(i) (S. Afr.).
147. Id. para. 46(b)(b).
148. See generally Kabuika v. Minister of Home Affairs 1997 (4) SA 341 (C) (S. Afr.)
149. Id. at 341- J ((noting that this was an application for an order directing the
respondents (the Standing Committee and the Refugee Appeal Board) to issue temporary
residence permits to the applicants pending the review of certain decisions of the
respondents).
150. Id. at 344J-345A.
163
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 27:2
relevant decisionmaking bodies had failed either to consider the reports
or to attach adequate weight to them and also that they had
misunderstood the asylum seekers' version of events regarding their
movements in Zaire. 151 The Court ordered the Minister of Home Affairs
to allow the applicants to remain in South Africa pending final
determination of the review proceedings that were instituted in respect
of to the decisions of the Standing Committee and the Refugee
Appeal Board.152
B. Refugee Status Determination Procedure under the Refugees Act, 1998
Since becoming operational on April 1, 2000, the Refugees Act has
undergone four amendments, but only one of these has come into
effect. 153 None of these amendments substantively affect the procedure
for refugee status determination established under the Refugees Act.
The following sections describe the procedure for application for refugee
status under the law as it currently stands.
The procedure for application for refugee status under the Refugees
Act, read with the Refugee Regulations promulgated by the Minister of
Home Affairs in terms of section 38 of the Act,154 is similar in many
respects to the previous procedure under the Aliens Control Act.155
Accordingly, judicial decisions such as Kabuika v. Minister of Home
Affairs16 and Baramoto and Others v. Minister of Home Affairs and
Others, 157 decided in 1997 and 1998, respectively, just before the
enactment of the Refugees Act, have informed courts adjudicating cases
concerning refugee status applications.
Baramoto involved three applicants, all former generals in the
armed forces of the former Zaire, who had entered South Africa in the
first half of 1997, following the fall of the government of long-time
151. Id. at 344-H.
152. Id. at 345C-E.
153. See generally infra note 197 (the four amendments made to the Refugees Act since
it became operational in 2000).
154. Regulations to the Refugees Act, GN R.366 of GG 6779 (6 Apr. 2000) (S. Afr.).
155. Refugees Act of 1998 ch. 2-3 (S. Afr.). The fundamental difference lies in the
philosophical approaches underpinning the procedures under the two regimes. As noted
earlier, the period prior to the Refugees Act was premised on a centralized bureaucratic
model, whereas the period from 2000 onwards is predicated on the notion of a
decentralized hearing-based model. See KLAAREN & SPRIGMAN, supra note 130, at 62-82.
156. See generally Kabuika v. Minister of Home Affairs 1997 (4) SA 341 (C) (S. Afr.)
(involving asylum-seekers from seeking an interim interdict to remain in South Africa
while awaiting judicial review of Standing Committee and Board decisions).
157. See, e.g., Baramoto and Others v. Minister of Home Affairs and Others 1998 (5)
BCLR 562 (W) (S. Afr.).
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dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Although the generals had initially entered
South Africa legally and held temporary residence permits, they were
arrested when they reentered the country after they had illegally
sneaked out to briefly return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.15 8
The South African government changed its attitude toward the
applicants, and adopted the position that their continued presence in
South Africa was no longer acceptable. The applicants were denied
renewal of their residence permits, and became liable for removal under
section 44, paragraph 1 of the Aliens Control Act. 159 The applicants
launched an urgent application in which they sought, inter alia, to
restrain the government from removing them from the country. They
also sought an order declaring that they were refugees as contemplated
in the refugee instruments binding on South Africa, and compelling the
Minister of Home Affairs to issue them temporary residence permits.
The Court ruled that the government was obliged to apply the law and
to give effect to the international agreements binding upon it. It
specifically noted that:
[ifJ the applicants qualify as refugees, notwithstanding
the settled intention of the Government of South Africa,
the applicants will be entitled to be dealt with as
refugees and would remain in South Africa subject to
the provisions of the OAU Convention as referred to in
the affidavit deposed to by the Minister of Safety
and Security. 160
The Court held that while the government was entitled to take
political decisions that might affect the status of the applicants, such
decisions "must be taken in terms of the law or the law must be
amended so that the political decisions are in conformity therewith." 16 '
The Court granted interim relief to the applicants and gave them ten
158. Id. at 568.
159. Id. at 569.
160. Id. at 575 (accepting without equivocation, the argument by the applicant's counsel
that the Government of South Africa was bound by the OAU Refugee Convention, the UN
Refugee Convention, and the Refugee Protocol, as well as the Constitution of South Africa,
ss. 231 and 232, which respectively provide that international agreements ratified by the
National Assembly and customary international law are binding on the Republic of
South Africa).
161. Id. at 577. Although this was not among the factual issues in the affidavits placed
before the Court, there was speculation in South African diplomatic and intelligence
circles that Mobutu's former generals were plotting to overthrow the new government of
Laurent Kabila. See Lynne Duke, Ex-Mobutu Aides Arrested, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 1997),
https://www.washingtonpost.comlarchive/politics/1997/12/16/ex-mobutu-aides-arrested.
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days within which to make any application for recognition of their
refugee status.1 62
All applications for refugee status and asylum must be made in
person without delay at any one of the four Refugee Reception Offices in
the country, and a Refugee Reception Officer (RRO), an official of the
Department of Home Affairs, is tasked with ensuring that applications
for asylum are properly completed. 163 If necessary, the RRO must assist
the applicant in completing the form, and may conduct an inquiry to
verify the information contained in the application. 164 In Kiliko v.
Minister of Home Affairs,165 the High Court held that the Department of
Home Affairs has a duty to provide adequate facilities essential for an
expeditious handling of applications for asylum seeker permits. 166 The
RRO is required to submit applications received by him or her to an
RSDO. 167 Consistent with Article 31 of the UN Refugee Convention, the
Refugees Act also provides that no proceedings against asylum
applicants waiting on a decision and who have had the opportunity to
exhaust their rights to review or appeal as well as those applicants
granted asylum, may be instituted or continued in respect of their
unlawful entry or presence in South Africa.16 8
The Supreme Court of Appeal has decided a number of cases that
implicate some of the provisions in the Refugees Act and Immigration
Act mentioned above.169 None of these cases reached the Constitutional
Court. However, in Ruta v. Minister of Home Affairs (Ruta),170 the Court
had occasion to determine two questions that had also been at issue in
the previous cases. The first set of questions arise from the requirement
in section 21 of the Refugees Act, which states that applications for
refugee status and asylum must be made "without delay." Does a delay
in submitting an application adversely affect the asylum seeker's right
to apply for asylum? And what length of period constitutes a delay?
162. Baramoto and Others v. Minister of Home Affairs and Others 1998 (5) BCLR 562
(W) at 577 (S. Afr.).
163. Refugees Act 130 of 1998 § 21(b) (S. Afr.). The four designated Refugee Reception
Offices are located in the cities of Durban, Musina, Port Elizabeth, and Pretoria,
164. Refugees Act 130 of 1998 § 21(2)(c) (S. Afr.).
165. See Kiliko v. Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (4) SA 114 (C) at para. 28 (S. Mr.).
166. See Intercape Ferreira Mainliner Ltd. v. Minister of Home Affairs 2010 (5) SA 367
(WCC) at paras. 21-24 (S. Afr.); 410 Voortrekker Rd. Prop. Holdings CC v. Minister of
Home Affairs 2010 (8) BCLR 785 (WCC) at paras. 2-4 (S. Mr.).
167. See Refugees Act § 24 (S. Afr.).
168. Id. § 21(4).
169. See, e.g., Abdi v. Minister of Home Affairs 2011 (3) SA 37 (SCA) (S. Afr.); Ersumo v.
Minister of Home Affairs 2012 (4) SA 581 (SCA) (S. Afr.); Bula v. Minister of Home Affairs
2011 ZASCA 209 (S. Afr.); Arse v. Minister of Home Affairs 2010 (7) BCLR 640 (SCA)
(S. Afr.).
170. Ruta v. Minister of Home Affairs 2018 ZACC 52 at para. 3 (S. Afr.).
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The second set of questions relate to whether an applicant's adverse
immigration status in the country, such as illegal entry or commission
of a crime while in South Africa, is relevant for determining
refugee status.
The applicant in this case, Alex Niwubona Ruta, was a Rwandan
national who had entered South Africa unlawfully in December 2014
and was, therefore, in terms of the Immigration Act, an illegal
immigrant. At issue was whether a prospective asylum seeker should be
allowed to apply for asylum at any time they might express an intention
to do so after arriving in the country-even if they have delayed-within
the terms of section 21 of the Refugees Act and whether an asylum-
seeker convicted of a crime committed within South Africa was barred
from applying for asylum. These questions involved the interface
between these twin pieces of legislation.
The RSDO had turned down Mr. Ruta's application for asylum. On
review, the High Court overruled this decision, determining that he was
entitled to be granted refugee status. However, on appeal, the Supreme
Court of Appeal departed from its own previous decisions and overruled
the High Court decision. It held that Ruta had failed to apply for asylum
"without delay," as both the Refugees Act and the Immigration Act
require. Additionally, it found that he was disqualified from applying for
and receiving a refugee permit because he had contravened the
Immigration Act by entering the country illegally and had been
convicted of a crime-traffic violations-while in South Africa.1 71 The
Constitutional Court unanimously overturned the Supreme Court of
Appeal's ruling. The Court held that under the Refugees Act, delay in
submitting an application does not in itself disqualify an asylum
application and that the only grounds on which an application may be
refused are those set out in the Refugees Act itself (discussed in the next
section below).17 2 The Court also held that while the Immigration Act
determines who is an "illegal foreigner" that is liable to deportation, the
Refugees Act is the only pertinent statute in determining who may seek
asylum and who is entitled to refugee status under a process managed
by the RROs and adjudicated by the RSDOs.173
The Ruta decision underscores the principles discussed in Part I of
this essay. First, regarding the individual right to asylum, the judgment
recognizes that foreign nationals do not have the right to enter, remain
171. Id. paras. 1-6 (setting out a summary of the facts and litigation history in the High
Court and Supreme Court of Appeal).
172. Id. para. 53 (stating that the Refugee Act, not the Immigration Act, is the
legislation governing asylum applications); id. para. 56 (stating that delay does not
function as an absolute disqualification from initiating the asylum application process).
173. See id. para. 43.
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or reside anywhere in South Africa and that no international
conventions create such a right. Second, however, by enabling asylum-
seekers to have their status determined under the Refugees Act, in
conformity with South Africa's obligations under international law, the
law ensures that they can have their applications for refugee status
properly considered under the process set out in the Refugees Act itself,
and not to be deported summarily under the Immigration Act. In other
words, they enjoy the protection of the principle of non-refoulement.
(i) Asylum Seekers: "Section 22 Permit"
Once a foreigner has made an application for asylum, the RRO must
issue the applicant with an asylum seeker permit allowing him or her to
sojourn in South Africa. 174 This permit-also known as the "section 22
permit"-remains valid while the application to be granted refugee
status is finalized.1 75 This allows the individual to remain legally in
South Africa and move about the country freely until their hearing to
determine their eligibility for refugee status. Under regulations
promulgated by the Minister of Home Affairs, asylum seekers were
prohibited from employment or studying, at least for the first six
months of their presence in South Africa. However, in Minister of Home
Affairs v. Watchenuka,176 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the
blanket prohibition violated asylum seekers' constitutional right to
dignity. In so finding, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that human
dignity has no nationality because it is inherent in all people, simply
because they are human. Asylum seekers are thus authorized, in
general, to work or study in South Africa pending the finalization of
their applications for asylum. Of course, in order to work or study,
asylum-seekers must obtain the relevant work or study permits that the
law requires of other non-nationals.
The section 22 permit also allows asylum seekers or immigrants to
access other services, such as opening a bank account, accessing
healthcare, and sending their children to schooL In the recent case of
Centre of Child Law v. Minister of Basic Education,17 7 the High Court
174. Refugees Act § 22 (S. Afr.).
175. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Somali Ass'n of S. Africa E. Cape 2015 (3) SA 545
(SCA) at para. 3 (S. Afr.).
176. Minister of Home Affairs v. Watchenuka 2004 (4) SA 326 (SCA) at 330 (S. Mr.).
177. Ctr. of Child Law v. Minister of Basic Educ. 2019 ZAECGHC 126 at para. 135 (S.
Afr.). The ruling is in line with the decision in Watchenuka (4) SA 326. The Supreme
Court of Appeal has subsequently reaffirmed Watchenuka in a number of other decisions.
See, e.g., Somali Ass'n of S. Africa v. Limpopo Dep't of Econ. Dev. Env't and Tourism 2014
ZASCA 143 at para. 40 (S. Afr.).
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confirmed that sections 39 and 42 of the Immigration Act do not
prohibit the provision of basic education, which is guaranteed under
section 29 of the Constitution of South Africa, to undocumented foreign
children. Sections 39 and 42 of the Immigration Act purport to prohibit
schools from providing basic education to children who are illegal
foreigners, which would include children of asylum seekers not yet in
possession of the section 22 permit. The ruling is thus as relevant to
illegal foreigners, in general, as it is to asylum-seekers specifically.
(ii) Decisions on Asylum Applications
Although their actual performance has not often lived up to this,
RSDOs are by law required to possess experience and knowledge of
refugee matters. 178 When considering or taking decisions on asylum
applications, they are bound by the provisions of the Constitution that
guarantee that "[e]veryone has the right to administrative action that is
lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair."179 RSDOs must also ensure
that the applicant fully understands the procedures, and their rights
and responsibilities. The RSDO may request information or clarification
from the applicant or the RRO, and may consult with a UNHCR
representative as necessary.
There are four possible outcomes to an asylum application. First,
the RSDO may grant asylum. Second, the application may be rejected as
unfounded, in which case the applicant may appeal to the Refugee
Appeals Authority (previously the Refugee Appeal Board). The Refugee
Appeals Authority may set aside or substitute a decision of the RSDO to
reject an asylum application. 180 Third, the RSDO may reject an
application as manifestly unfounded, abusive, or fraudulent. 181 The
record of applications rejected as manifestly unfounded, abusive or
fraudulent must be submitted to the Standing Committee. 182 Fourth,
the RSDO may refer any question of law to the Standing Committee
before making a final determination. In that case, the Standing
178. Ref Refugees Act § 8(2)(b) (S. Afr.).
179. Id. § 24(2); S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 33(1).
180. Refugees Act §§ 24(3)(c), 26(2) (S. Afr.).
181. Abusive applications are those made with the purpose of defeating or evading
criminal or civil proceedings or repeated applications made without any substantial
change in the applicant's personal circumstances or in his or her country of origin; id. §
1(i). Fraudulent applications are those made by applicants who know the facts contained
in the application to be false and such facts are intended to materially affect the outcome
of the application; id. § 1(xi). Manifestly unfounded applications are those made on
grounds other than the recognized grounds for granting asylum; id. § 1(xii).
182. Id. § 24(4)(b); see Tripartite Agreement, supra note 140 (describing the
establishment of the Standing Committee).
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Committee must refer the application back to the RSDO within fourteen
days, with such directives as may be necessary, and oblige the RSDO to
decide on the application in terms of the directives. Determinations
should generally be adjudicated within 180 days of the filing of a
completed asylum application with the RRO.183
The leading case on the substance and process for asylum
applications is Tantoush v. Refugee Appeal Board. In this case, the High
Court set aside the rejection of Tantoush's application for asylum by the
Refugee Appeal Board, and substituted its own decision by declaring
that he was a refugee and entitled to asylum. 184 In doing so, it held that
the appropriate standard to be applied is one of "a well-founded fear of
persecution," used by the US Supreme Court in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca,1s8 and not, as the Refugee
Appeal Board had held, that an applicant was required to prove "a real
risk of persecution on a balance of probabilities." 8 6
Applicants have the right to appeal to the High Court for a review of
the decisions that have rejected their refugee status applications, and in
many cases they have done so unopposed by the Department of Home
Affairs.18 7 At the same time, RROs have an obligation to renew the
asylum seeker's permit until the High Court review is finalized. 8 8
C. Objectives and Other Aspects of the Refugees Act, 1998
The Refugees Act was enacted to give effect to the OAU Refugee
Convention and the UN Refugee Convention within South Africa, 8 9
183. GN R.366 of GG 21075 § 3(1) (S. Mr.).
184. Tantoush v. Refugee Appeal Bd. 2008 (1) SA 232 (T) at 233-34 (S. Afr.). Cf. Arse v.
Minister of Home Affairs 2010 (7) BCLR 640 (SCA) at paras. 15-17 (S. Afr.).
185. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
186. The essential difference here is thus between "a reasonable fear of persecution" as
against "a clear probability of persecution."
187. See, e.g., Tekalign v. Minister of Home Affairs 2018 (3) All SA 23 (ECP) at para. 1
(S. Afr.). See also Ngwenya v. Minister of Home Affairs 2017 ZAGPJHC 222 at para. 1 (S.
Afr.); O.N. v. Chairperson of the Standing Comm. for Refugee Affairs 2017 ZAWCHC 57 at
para. 11 (S. Afr.); Mubala v. Chairperson of the Standing Comm. for Refugee Affairs 2013
ZAWCHC 208 at para. 20 (S. Afr.).
188. Saidi v. Minister of Home Affairs 2018 (4) SA 333 (CC) (S. Afr.).
189. The Refugees Act in its own terms describes its objective as "Act to give effect
within the Republic of South Africa to relevant international legal instruments, principles
and standards relating to [refugees]." Furthermore, the Preamble states: "WHEREAS the
Republic of South Africa has acceded to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 Organization
of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa
as well as other human rights instruments [BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED] by the
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, as [follows]."
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provide for the reception of asylum seekers, regulate applications for
and recognition of refugee status, and provide for the rights and
obligations flowing from such status. These objectives have been
reaffirmed in a number of cases, including Watchenuka v. Minister of
Home Affairs,190 Minister of Home Affairs v. Watchenuka,191 Kiliko v.
Minister of Home Affairs,1 92 Abdi v. Minister of Home Affairs;193 and
Scalabrini Centre v. Minister of Home Affairs. 194 The Refugees Act
expressly stipulates that it must be interpreted and applied with due
regard to the OAU Refugee Convention, the UN Refugee Convention,
the Refugee Protocol, the UDHR, and any other relevant human rights
treaty to which South Africa is a party,19 5 a point that was underscored
by some legal commentators shortly after it became effective.' 9 6 Since
its enactment, the Refugees Act has been amended four times: in 2008,
2011, 2015, and 2017.197 Except for the 2015 amendment, none of the
amendments have come into operation. The key change in the 2015
amendment is that a Refugee Appeals Authority has replaced the
Refugee Appeal Board, and the media and general public are allowed to
access the Authority's hearings.
As pointed out earlier, the definition of a refugee and the criteria for
granting refugee status, provided for in the Refugees Act, mirror those
in the UN Refugee Convention, the Refugee Protocol, and the OAU
Refugee Convention.19 8 Consistent with Article I, paragraph 2 of the
OAU Refugee Convention, the Refugees Act also provides that a person
may qualify for refugee status if, owing to external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing or
disrupting public order, in either a part or the whole of his or her
country of origin or nationality, he or she is compelled to leave his or her
190. Watchenuka v. Minister of Home Affairs 2003 (1) SA 619 (SCA) at 621 F-I (S. Afr.).
191. Minister of Home Affairs v. Watchenuka 2004 (4) SA 326 (SCA) at para. 2 (S. Afr.).
192. Kiliko v. Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (4) SA 114 (C) at para. 25 (S. Afr.).
193. Abdi v Minister of Home Affairs 2011 (3) SA 37 (SCA) at para. 22 (S. Afr.).
194. Scalabrini Ctr., Cape Town v. Minister of Home Affairs 2017 (4) All SA (SCA) at 16
para. 35 (S. Mr.).
195. See Refugees Act § 6 (S. Afr.).
196. See generally Margaret Beukes, 'Economic Refugees:' South African Reality and
International Refugee Law, 27 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 206 (2002); Simla Budhu, The Extent of
Municipal Obligation Towards Refugees in South Africa, 26 S. APR. Y.B. INT'L L. 246
(2001); Frankie Jenkins, Coming to South Africa: An Overview of the Application for
Asylum and an Introduction to the Refugees Act, 24 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 182 (1999);
(providing background information and an introduction to the Refugees Act).
197. Respectively, Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008 (S. Afr.), not yet in force;
Refugees Amendment Act 12 of 2011(S. Afr.), not yet in force; Refugees Amendment Act
10 of 2015 (S. Afr.), assented to on Sept. 23, 2015, came into operation on Sept. 27, 2015;
Refugees Amendment Act 11 of 2017 (S. Afr.), not yet in force.
198. See Refugees Act § 3(a) (S. Aft.).
171
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 27:2
place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge elsewhere. 199
Another unique feature of the Refugees Act is that it defines "social
group" broadly, to include a group of persons of a particular gender,
sexual orientation, disability, class, or caste. 200
1. Non-refoulement and Access to South African Territory
In this paper, we have noted the wide consensus that the principle
of non-refoulement obliges states to refrain from forcibly returning a
refugee to a state where they are likely to suffer persecution or danger
to life or freedom. 20 1 This principle is generally regarded as having
crystallized into a rule of customary international law. 202 The
prohibition on refoulement is an exception to the international law rule
that grants every sovereign state the inherent power to forbid the
entrance of aliens into its territory, or to admit them only in such cases
and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. 203
The principle of non-refoulement also operates to ensure that
asylum-seekers may not be turned away at the border. The UN Refugee
Convention protects asylum-seekers who have crossed into the territory
of a state without authorization. 204 Both the UN General Assembly's
199. Id. § 3(b).
200. The act also provides that dependents of a person granted refugee status are also to
be regarded as refugees. Id. § 1(xxi).
201. See generally D'Orsi, supra note 91; see Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 70.
As it relates to South Africa, see the discussion by Fatima Khan. Fatima Khan, The
Principle of Non-refoulement, in Khan & Schreier, supra note 12, at 3-19.
202. C. Costello & M. Foster, Non-refoulement as Custor and Jus Cogens? Putting the
Prohibition to the Test, 46 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 273, 274 (2015); Saidi v. Minister of Home
Affairs 2018 (7) BCLR 856 (CC) at para. 32 (S. Afr.); Kabuika v. Minister of Home Affairs
1997 (4) SA 341 (C) at 343 (S. Afr.). The term "customary international law" is used here
in the sense in which it is commonly understood or defined by international lawyers,
namely as consisting of rules derived from the habitual conduct of states or a general
practice accepted as law, and existing independently of treaty law.
203. See Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 662 (1892). See also Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Xu v.
Minister van Binnelandse Sake 1995 (1) BCLR 62 (T) (S. Afr.); Naidenov v. Minister of
Home Affairs 1995 (7) BCLR 891 (T); Parekh v Minister of Home Affairs 1996 (2) SA 710
(D). But see Foulds v. Minister of Home Affairs 1996 (4) SA 137 (W); Tettey v. Minister of
Home Affairs 1999 (3) SA 715 (D); Jonathan Klaaren, So far not so Good: An Analysis of
Immigration Decisions Under the Interim Constitution, 12 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 605
(1996); R. Pretorius, Protecting the Rights of Aliens in South Africa: International and
Constitutional Issues, 21 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L 130 (1996); R.J. Purshotam, The Right of
Aliens and Migrants to Administrative Justice and a Brief Look at the Abuse Suffered by
Them in South Africa, 116 S. AFR. L.J. 32 (1999); J. Nafziger, The General Admission of
Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 804 (1983).
204. UN Refugee Convention, supra note 10, art. 33(1).
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Declaration on Territorial Asylum and the OAU Refugee Convention
declare that asylum seekers should not face "measures such as rejection
at the frontier." 205 South Africa acknowledges the obligation to allow
asylum seekers entry into its territory in terms of the Refugees Act,
which expressly states that no person seeking asylum may be refused
entry.206 Furthermore, South Africa makes two concessions for asylum
seekers, which exempts them from its ordinarily applicable standards
for migration. These concessions are immunity from prosecution for
unlawful entry into or presence within the country, and protection from
treatment as illegal immigrants. 207
First, under the Refugees Act, asylum seekers are permitted to
enter South Africa without the need for a passport or a valid visa. 208
Moreover, the Immigration Act provides that immigration officials may
"issue an asylum transit visa to a person who at a port of entry claims to
be an asylum-seeker, valid for a period of five days only, to travel to the
nearest Refugee Reception Office in order to apply for asylum." 209 The
Immigration Act, and the regulations promulgated under it, bestow no
authority on border officials to conduct interviews relating to the
validity or otherwise of a claim made by an asylum seeker, but they may
issue an asylum transit visa to an asylum seeker who applies "in person
at a port of entry." 210 The issuance of such a visa does not imply the
validity of the asylum claim itself. Second, the Refugees Act protects
asylum seekers who enter South Africa irregularly. 211 Refugees are
protected from arrest, detention, and deportation as illegal immigrants
under section 2 of the Refugees Act. Under the provisions of this section,
no person may be "expelled, extradited or returned to any other country"
if that person may be subjected to persecution on account of their race,
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular
social group, or if such person's physical safety or freedom would be
threatened on account of external aggression, occupation, foreign
domination, or other events that seriously disturb public order.
205. G.A. Res. 2312(XXII) (Dec. 14, 1967); OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 8,
art. 11(3).
206. Refugees Act § 2 (S. Afr.); see Abdi v. Minister of Home Affairs 2011 (5) BCLR 529
(SCA) at para. 22.
207. Refugees Act § 21(4) (S. Afr.);
208. This is the logical implication of the express prohibition of denial of entry to
persons arriving at the port of entry and seeking asylum; in most cases, especially in
situations of mass flight, refugees do not travel with visas.
209. See generally Immigration Regulations 2002, GN R.22 of GG 10199 (22 May 2014)
(setting out the procedure for an asylum transit visa for asylum-seekers).
210. Immigration Regulations 2002, Regulation 22(1), GN R.413 of GG 37679 (22 May
2014).
211. Refugees Act § 21(4) (S. Afr.).
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The Constitutional Court reaffirmed the principle of non-
refoulement in Gavri6 v. Refugee Status Determination Officer. 212
Briefly, the facts of the case as set out in the judgment are that
Dobrosav Gavri6 fled his native country of Serbia because he feared for
his life following the assassination in 2000 of Zeljo Rainatovi6,
commonly known as Arkan. Rainatovi6 was a commander of a
paramilitary unit closely aligned with the government of Slobodan
Milogevi6 during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
Gavri6 was present at Rainatovi6's assassination and became the main
suspect for the murder. He fled illegally to South Africa in 2007 under a
false name and passport. In the meantime, on October 9, 2008, he was
convicted in absentia of the murders of Rainatovi6 and his two
bodyguards. He was initially sentenced to a term of 30 years'
imprisonment, but this was later increased on appeal to 35 years'
imprisonment by the Serbian Supreme Court. In 2012, Gavri6 applied
for refugee status in South Africa on the grounds that he was falsely
believed to be a member of the political group responsible for the
commander's death, and had a well-founded fear of being killed by the
deceased's supporters. The RSDO refused to grant refugee status under
section 4(1)(b) of the Refugees Act, which provides that a person does
not qualify for refugee status if there is reason to believe that he or she
committed a crime which is not of a political nature and which, if
committed in South Africa, would be punishable by imprisonment.
Gavri6 applied to the High Court (Western Cape Division) for a
review of the RSDO's decision rejecting his application for asylum. The
presiding judge dismissed the application and also denied him leave to
appeal to the full bench of the High Court. The Supreme Court of
Appeal also refused him leave to appeal, after which he sought leave to
appeal from the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court held,
inter alia, that non-refoulement applies even to those who have been
excluded from refugee status under section 4(1)(b) of the Refugees Act.
The Constitutional Court recalled that in two previous cases, it had
concluded that:
The State, or any official in the employ of the State, does
not have the power to extradite or deport or in any way
remove a person from South Africa to a retentionist
State, who, to its knowledge, if deported or extradited to
212. Gavrid v. Refugee Status Determination Officer, Cape Town and Others 2019 (1)
BCLR 1 (CC) at paras. 26-27, 38 (S. Afr.).
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such a State, will face the real risk of the imposition and
execution of the death penalty. 213
In Gavri6, the Constitutional Court addressed the possibility that an
excluded applicant could be returned to a country where there was a
risk that they may be killed or persecuted. 214 The Court also
emphasized that, given the catastrophic consequences that can result if
an asylum application is wrongly rejected, and that many applicants are
unrepresented, vulnerable, and lacking in the necessary language and
legal skills, RSDOs must provide adequate reasons for rejections.
Similarly, it concluded that procedural fairness demands that any
information relied upon by the authorities must be provided to the
asylum seeker so that they have a fair and meaningful opportunity to
make representations and to know what factors may weigh against
their interests. 215 The Court concluded that Gavri6 had been denied
procedural fairness. We return to this case in more detail below (in Part
III.C.2) in relation to the question of a political crime for purposes of
exclusion from refugee status.
The Constitutional Court has again reaffirmed the principle of non-
refoulement even more strongly in another decision after Gavri6. In the
more recent case of Ruta v. Minister of Home Affairs, 216 the Court
demonstrated a keen appreciation of the burden that refugees impose on
the State, and the particular burdens the Department of Home Affairs
and its officials are obliged to bear. But the Court was again
unequivocal in upholding both the constitutional principles underlying
the Refugees Act and the Immigration Act, and the plain meaning of the
language in those statutes. The ratio of the judgment is that "[all]
asylum-seekers are protected by the principle of non-refoulement, and
the protection applies as long as the claim to refugee status has not
been finally rejected after a proper procedure." 217 And that section 2 of
the Refugees Act "embodies all these principles. It goes further than the
1951 Convention. Its more generous wording is derived from our own
213. Id. at paras. 26-27 nn. 17, 22 (recalling Minister of Home Affairs v. Tsebe 2012 (10)
BCLR 1017 (CC), and Mohamed v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. (Soc'y for the
Abolition of the Death Penalty in S. Afr. and Another Intervening) 2001 (7) BCLR 685
(CC)).
214. Since Gavri6 had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and not the death
penalty, he claimed that he feared being killed or persecuted by supporters of Arkan, the
commander for whose murder he had been convicted. See supra, note 212, Gavrid v.
Refugee Status Determination Officer, Cape Town 2018 (38) ZACC 1 (CC) at para. 2
(S. Afr.).
215. Id. TT 72-75, 78-81.
216. Ruta v. Minister of Home Affairs 2019 (3) BCLR 383 (CC) at para. 58 (S. Afr.).
217. Id. T 29.
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continent-the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the
Specific Aspects of Refugee Status [sic] in Africa." 218
It is worth quoting the Constitutional Court's judgment on this
point in extenso. After recalling the provision in section 2 of the
Refugees Act, which encapsulates the principle of non-refoulement, the
Court states:
This is a remarkable provision. Perhaps it is
unprecedented in the history of our country's
enactments. It places the prohibition it enacts above any
contrary provision of the Refugees Act itself - but also
places its provisions above anything in any other statute
or legal provision. That is a powerful decree. Practically
it does two things. It enacts a prohibition. But it also
expresses a principle: that of non-refoulement, the
concept that one fleeing persecution or threats to "his or
her life, physical safety or freedom" should not be made
to return to the country inflicting it.
It is a noble principle - one our country, for deep-going
reasons springing from persecution of its own people,
has emphatically embraced. The provenance of section 2
of the Refugees Act lies in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Universal Declaration), which
guarantees "the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution". The year in which
the Universal Declaration was adopted is of anguished
significance to our country, for in 1948 the apartheid
government came to power. Its mission was to formalise
and systematise, with often vindictive cruelty, existing
racial subordination, humiliation and exclusion. From
then, as apartheid became more vicious and obdurate,
our country began to produce a rich flood of its own
refugees from persecution, impelled to take shelter in all
parts of the world, but especially in other parts of
Africa. That history looms tellingly over any
understanding we seek to reach of the Refugees Act.
The principle of protecting refugees from persecution
was elaborated three years after the Universal
Declaration, in article 33 of the Convention Relating to
218. Id. T 30.
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the Status of Refugees of 1951 (1951 Convention). This
gave substance to article 14 of the Universal
Declaration. The 1951 Convention defined "refugees",
while codifying non-refoulement. South Africa as a
constitutional democracy became a State Party to the
1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol when it acceded
to both of them on January 12, 1996 - which it did
without reservation. In doing so, South Africa embraced
the principle of non-refoulement as it has developed
since 1951. The principle has been a cornerstone of the
international law regime on refugees. It has also become
a deeply-lodged part of customary international law and
[is] part of international human rights law. As refugees
put agonising pressure on national authorities and on
national ideologies in Europe, North America, and
elsewhere, the response to these principles of African
countries, including our own, is of profound
importance. 219
This decision is the most recent pronouncement on, and definitive
interpretation of, the principle of non-refoulement by the Constitutional
Court, that is at the highest judicial level.
2. Treatment of Asylum Seekers and Refugees:
Detention, Exclusion and Cessation
(i) Detention of Failed Asylum Seekers
The detention of failed asylum seekers has been an officially
sanctioned policy in South Africa since the end of apartheid. Such
persons are usually held in camps that have been established in various
parts of the country for undocumented migrants pending their
repatriation. 220 But as discussed below, the problem is that in
219. Id. TT 24-26.
220. The best known of these is the Lindela Repatriation Centre (Lindela) located in the
small town of Krugersdorp, west of Johannesburg. Established by the Department of
Home Affairs in 1995 as a holding facility for foreigners awaiting deportation, and not a
refugee camp as such, it has become infamous as a camp where failed asylum-seekers
have routinely been held, sometimes unlawfully. Unsurprisingly, it has attracted much
criticism from human rights and refugee rights advocates. See RoNi AMiT, BREAKING THE
LAW, BREAKING THE BANK: THE COST OF HOME AFFAIRS' ILLEGAL DETENTION PRACTICES
51-57 (2012). See generally Corey Johnson, Failed Asylum Seekers in South Africa: Policy
and Practice, 1 AFR. HuM. MOBILITY REv. 201 (2015) (discussing the issues surrounding
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implementing the policy, officials of the Department of Home Affairs
and officers of the police force have detained and deported illegal aliens
and asylum seekers alike, probably due to a combination of ineptitude
and deliberate disregard of the law. Indeed, some commentators have
noted that the issue of immigration detention illustrates the tension
between mixed migration and refugee protection, and how law
enforcement officials and other government functionaries often fail to
distinguish between asylum seekers, illegal immigrants, and
criminals. 22 1 While the use of immigration detention is fairly common
around the world, empirical evidence from South Africa reveals a high
incidence of its use at the expense of asylum seekers. 222 The cases also
suggest a less coordinated, more arbitrary, and more poorly defined
response to managing immigration and asylum applications among the
concerned government departments and officials. 223
The Immigration Act and the Refugees Act establish the legal
framework of immigration detention in South Africa. The Immigration
Act provides that a person subject to deportation or detention as an
illegal foreigner "[may] at any time request any officer attending to him
or her that his or her detention for the purpose of deportation be
confirmed by warrant of a Court, which, if not issued within 48 hours of
such request, shall cause the immediate release of such foreigner."224
Section 34(l)(d) of the Immigration Act further states that the foreigner
concerned "[may] not be held in detention for longer than 30 calendar
days without a warrant of a Court which on good and reasonable
grounds may extend such detention for an adequate period not
exceeding 90 calendar days." Section 4(l)(e) provides that such foreigner
"[shall] be held in detention in compliance with minimum prescribed
standards protecting his or her dignity and relevant human rights."225
As discussed earlier, the principle of non-refoulement prohibits the
detention of asylum seekers for purposes of returning them to the
territory from which they have fled due to a well-founded fear of
persecution. Therefore, any deportation of an asylum seeker, who is
authorized by the Department of Home Affairs before their status
determination, is a violation of international law. However, the
Refugees Act contains provisions that allow for the detention and
the lack of implementation of the refugee protection framework and analyzing South
Africa's failed policies to address failed asylum seekers).
221. See Lucy Kiama & Dennis Likule, Detention in Kenya: Risks for Refugees and
Asylum Seekers, 44 FORCED MIGRATION REv. 34, 35 (2013).
222. See AMIT, supra note 220.
223. See Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp & Mark Shaw, Please go Home and Build Africa:
Criminalising Immigrants in South Africa, 42 J. SourHERN AFR. STUD. 983, 994 (2016).
224. Immigration Act 13 of 2002 § 34(1)(b) (S. Afr.). Emphasis in the original.
225. Id. § 34(1)(e). Emphasis in the original.
178
WHO IS A REFUGEE?
subsequent deportation of asylum-seekers. First, section 22(6) provides
that "[the] Minister may at any time withdraw an asylum-seeker permit
if: (a) the applicant contravenes any conditions endorses on that permit;
(b) the application has been found to be manifestly unfounded, abusive
or fraudulent." Secondly, sections 23 and 29 complete this legal
framework. Section 23 states that:
If the Minister has withdrawn an asylum seeker permit
in terms of section 22(6), he or she may, subject to
section 29, cause the holder to be arrested and detained
pending the finalisation of the application for asylum, in
the manner and place determined by him or her with
due regard to human dignity.
And section 29 provides that:
No person may be detained in terms of this Act for a
longer period than is reasonable and justifiable and any
detention exceeding 30 days may be reviewed
immediately by a judge of the High Court of the
provincial division in whose area of jurisdiction the
person is detained, designated by the Judge President of
that division for that purpose and such detention must
be reviewed in this manner immediately after the expiry
of every subsequent period of 30 days.
Thus, when considering the detention of asylum seekers and
refugees, courts are assisted as much by decisions concerning the
detention of foreigners under the Aliens Control Act and the
Immigration Act as by the Refugees Act. 226 The major difference
between the Immigration Act and the Refugee Act is that under the
latter, the asylum seeker can be detained only in terms of an order of
the minister, and such detentions must be reviewed every thirty days by
a judge of the High Court in the provincial division in whose area of
jurisdiction the person is detained, designated by the Judge President of
that division for that purpose. 227 In the meantime, pending a final
status determination, the detained asylum seeker cannot be "removed
from the Republic" (i.e. deported) except on grounds of national security
226. See, e.g., Minister of Home Affairs v. Rahim 2016 (3) SA 218 (CC), (6) BCLR 780 (S.
Afr.); Aruforse v. Minister of Home Affairs 2010 (6) SA 579 (GSJ) (S. Afr.); Ulde v. Minister
of Home Affairs 2009 (4) SA 522 (SCA) (S. Mr.).
227. Immigration Act 13 of 2002 § 29(1) (S. Mr.).
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or public order; and such removal may only be ordered by the minister
"with due regard for the rights set out in section 33 of the Constitution
and the rights of the refugee in terms of international law." 228 Yet based
on their interviews with security officials and immigrant and refugee
rights campaigners, Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp and Mark Shaw have
confirmed that the police unlawfully detained immigrants for more than
forty-eight hours, and that some immigrants with expired asylum
seeker permits were being held in police stations in Cape Town. 229 Amit
has similarly reported systematic abuses by officials of the Department
of Home Affairs, which she describes as "a government department that
routinely violates its constitutional duties and its legislative obligations
under both the Refugees Act and Immigration Act," and "actions
display[s] a general contempt for the legal process, [fails] to implement
court orders, and continues to act in direct in contravention of judicial
rulings."230
These accounts confirm the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal
in Rahim v. Minister of Home Affairs,231 which ruled that fifteen illegal
foreigners had been unlawfully detained by the Department of Home
Affairs. Likewise, in Arse v. Minister of Home Affairs (Arse),232 the High
Court ruled in favor of an asylum seeker from Ethiopia who had failed
to obtain an asylum- seeker permit because the lines of applicants in the
Port Elizabeth Refugee Reception Office were too long. 233 He was
arrested as an illegal foreigner and spent a week at a police station
before being transferred to Lindela Repatriation Centre, pending
deportation. 234 The Court ruled that Arse's detention had extended for
more than 30 days; and that the detention of an asylum-seeker for the
purpose of deporting him or her would violate section 2 of the Refugees
228. Id. § 28(1), (2). Section 33 of the Constitution of South Africa provides that
everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable, and
procedurally fair; and that everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by
administrative action has the right to be given written reasons. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996,
§ 33(1) and (2), supra note 14.
229. See Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw, supra note 223, at 995.
230. See AMIT, supra note 220, at 7, 51-57 (discussing violations of the law inside
Lindela by the department of Home Affairs).
231. See Rahim v. Minister of Home Affairs 2015 (4) SA 433 (SCA) (S. Afr.). The case
was appealed to the Constitutional Court, which ruled on February 16, 2016, that the
Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs was required to apply his or her mind
to what places are appropriate for the detention of illegal foreigners. Absent a
determination having been made, the respondents were detained unlawfully and thus to
be awarded damages. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Rahim 2016 (3) SA 218 (CC) at
paras. 2, 11 (S. Afr.).
232. Arse v. Minister of Home Affairs 2012 (4) SA 544 (SCA) at para. 1 (S. Mr.).
233. Id. 1 2.
234. Id. IT 2, 8.
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Act (enshrining the principle of non-refoulement). Accordingly, the Court
ordered the Department of Home Affairs to reissue Arse with an
asylum-seeker permit.235
Arse also reconfirmed that the failure, by an asylum seeker, to
obtain a section 22 permit does not provide per se justification for
detention. Amit reiterates that the Supreme Court of Appeal repeated
the characterization of this practice as illegal, and recalls the Court's
declaration that officials of the Department of Home Affairs "have a
duty to ensure that intending applicants for refugee status are given
every reasonable opportunity to file an application with the relevant
[Refugee Reception Office]."236
The facts in Ersumo v. Minister of Home Affairs,237 adjudicated two
years after Arse, were similar. The case also involved an Ethiopian
asylum seeker arrested as an illegal foreigner and detained for not
having a section 22 permit. He had tried to obtain his asylum seeker
permit, but he too gave up due to delays caused by long lines of
applicants at the RRO. Citing its earlier decision in Bula v. Minister of
Home Affairs (Bula),238 the Court noted that when an illegal foreign
national indicates an intention to apply for asylum, the protection
afforded by the Refugees Act applied to such a person. Like the
applicants in Bula, Ersumo had communicated his intention to the
authorities even while he was in detention at Lindela, and was thus
entitled to the benefit of the rights afforded by the Refugees Act and
Immigration Regulation 2, paragraph 2 to the Immigration Act (on
issuance of permits). The Court ordered the Department of Home
Affairs to issue an asylum transit permit to Ersumo, valid for fourteen
days, and to set down an expedited hearing for him. 239
The most recent case concerning, in part, asylum seeker permits in
South Africa is Al and Others v. Director of Asylum Management:
Department of Home Affairs.240 Three undocumented foreign nationals
from Burundi made an urgent application to the High Court to compel
the respondents, the Department of Home Affairs and others, to provide
235. Id. ¶ 22.
236. See AMIT, supra note 220, at 31 (stating that several asylum-seekers detain at
Lindela were denied access to asylum process and were sent there after indicating their
intention to apply for asylum).
237. See Ersumo v. Minister of Home Affairs 2012 (4) SA 581 (SCA) (S. Afr.). Cf. Tafira
v. Ngozwane 2006 ZAGPHC 136 (S. Mr.), with Dawood v. Minister of Home Affairs 2000
SA FLII 1 (CC) (S. Mr.) (earlier cases).
238. Bula v. Minister of Home Affairs 2011 ZASCA 209; 2012 (4) SA 560 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
239. Ersumo v. Minister of Home Affairs 2012 (4) SA 581 (SCA) at paras. 17-18, 21, 23
(S. Afr.).
240. See Al and Others v. Dir. of Asylum Mgmt.: Dep't of Home Affairs 2019 SA FLII 1
(HC) (S. Mr.).
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them with section 22 permits, pending final determination of their
application for refugee status. 241 The facts were that the applicants
arrived in South Africa from Burundi between 2006 and 2012 and
applied for asylum in terms of the Refugees Act. Their applications were
rejected in 2014 as being manifestly unfounded. Subsequent to the
rejection of their applications, and especially in 2015, widespread
political violence broke out in Burundi causing hundreds of thousands of
Burundians to flee the country. Perceived opponents of the government
who remained in Burundi were allegedly subjected to oppression,
torture, rape, and sexual violence. The applicants argued that this rise
in political violence rendered a return to Burundi unsafe, and that this
change in circumstances warranted a new application for asylum. The
Director of Asylum Seeker Management argued, however, that a failed
asylum-seeker who had not departed South Africa after his or her
application had been rejected must be deported. The applicants
counterargued that the Department of Home Affairs effectively closed
the door on them by refusing to accept and consider their applications.
They further argued that without the section twenty-two permits, they
remained undocumented, vulnerable, unable to secure accommodation
or obtain jobs to provide for themselves and their families, and that they
could at any time be arrested, detained, and/or deported.
The Court relied on the Ruta decision, in which that court found
that delay was not a basis to exclude the applicant from making an
asylum application. 242 Judge Myburgh found the delay on the part of the
three applicants in filing new applications, because the Department of
Home Affairs officials refused to accept and consider their applications,
was factually similar to Ruta. Unsurprisingly, he followed the
Constitutional Court's ruling in Ruta that the Immigration Act does not
trump the Refugees Act to provide a justification for the deportation of
an asylum-seeker whose application had not been definitively
determined. 243 Judge Myburgh concluded that the applicants had a
well-founded apprehension of harm and that they had a clear right to
the relief they sought in their main application: namely, to be afforded
the opportunity to make new applications. He ordered the Department
of Home Affairs, in the meantime, to issue them with the section 22
permits. 244
The cases discussed above all reaffirm the two principles of
international refugee law discussed earlier. First, there is no individual
right to asylum that an asylum seeker can assert against a State:
241. Id. ¶ 1.
242. Ruta v. Minister of Home Affairs 2018 ZACC 52 at para. 56 (S. Mr.).
243. Id. at 19 ¶ 36.
244. Id. at 20 ¶ 39.
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the grant of asylum remains a matter of sovereign choice. Second,
however, under both the UN Refugee Convention and OAU Refugee
Convention, States have an obligation to not return a person to the
country of origin from which they have fled due to a well-founded fear of
persecution and to allow him or her to access the asylum application
processes.
(ii) Exclusion from Refugee Status
The Refugees Act excludes certain persons from qualifying for
refugee status. These include: persons whom there is reason to believe
have committed a crime against peace, a war crime; a crime against
humanity; or a crime which is not of a political nature and which, if
committed in South Africa, would be punishable by imprisonment.24 5
Similarly, persons who are guilty of acts contrary to the objectives and
principles of the UN or the OAU (or, presumably, now the AU) are
excluded from consideration for refugee status. 246 A person who enjoys
the protection of any other state in which they have taken residence will
also fail to qualify as a refugee. 247 Section 4(1)(a) draws from similarly-
worded provisions in the UN Refugee Convention and the OAU Refugee
Convention.248
The relevance of section 4(1)(a) has been an issue in several cases,
including Gavri6 and Ruta. It has also arisen in the protracted case of
Faustin Nyamwasa, a former colleague of Rwandan president Paul
Kagame. Nyamwasa held a prominent position in the Rwandan
government, but fled to South Africa where he was granted asylum in
2010.249 He was granted refugee status despite allegations by human
rights groups-and some foreign governments 250-that he had been
involved in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity
between 1994 and 1998. In 2014, the High Court ruled that Nyamwasa
245. Refugees Act § 4(1)(b) (S. Afr.); see Tatoush v. Refugee Appeal Board 2008 (1) SA
232 (T) at paras. 109-24 (S. Afr.).
246. Refugees Act § 4(1)(c) (S. Afr.) (although this provision has not been amended, this
should be understood to mean the AU).
247. Id. § 4(1)(d). See, e.g., Abdi v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't 1996 (1) All ER 641;
R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Exparte Canbolat 1998 [1] All ER 161.
248. GA. Res. 2198 (XXI) art. 1.F, UN Refugee Convention (Dec. 16, 1967);
Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention art. I(4)(f)-(g), June 20, 1974.
249. Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in S. Afr. v. President of the Republic of S.
Afr. 2014 (SAFLII) 1 ZAGPPHC at para. 3 (S. Afr.).
250. See Cases-Extradition from South Africa: Case of Kayumba Nyamwasa, 13 Y.B.
INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 611, 611 (M.N. Schmidt, L. Arimatsu & T. MacCormack eds.,
2010).
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had been correctly granted refugee status. 251 However, on May 25, 2017,
when it was set to hear an appeal by the Consortium for Refugees and
Migrants in South Africa (CormSA) against the High Court decision, the
Supreme Court of Appeal formalized an agreement between CormSA
and several government respondents to set aside the government's
decision granting Nyamwasa refugee status. The government was given
180 days to reconsider and make a final decision on Nyamwasa's
refugee status. 252 South Africa has maintained his refugee status and
resisted demands to extradite him to Rwanda. 253
(iii) Cessation of Refugee Status
Under section 5(1) of the Refugees Act, a person recognized as a
refugee ceases to qualify as such in five situations. First, if they
voluntarily re-avail themselves of the protection of their country of
nationality. Second, if they reacquire their nationality, after they had
lost it by some voluntary and formal act. Third, in terms of section 5 of
the Citizenship Act No. 88 of 1995 (as amended in 2010), if they become
a citizen of South Africa by naturalization, or acquire the nationality of
some other country and enjoy the protection of the country of their new
nationality. Fourth, if they voluntarily reestablish themselves in the
country from which they originally fled. Fifth, when the circumstances
in connection with which they were recognized as a refugee ceases to
exist and no other circumstances arise that justify their continued
recognition as a refugee. Of these five scenarios, the most common is the
acquisition of South African nationality by naturalization. The last
251. See Cases-Extradition from South Africa: Case of Kayumba Nyamwasa, id. para.
26.
252. See Kyle Cowan, Former Rwandan General Nyamwasa's Refugee Status Set Aside,
SOWETANLIVE, (May 25, 2017), https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/2017-05- 2 5-former-
rwandan-general-nyamwasas-refugee-status-set-aside. The South African government
regards General Faustin Nyamwasa as a political exile and a target of several attempted
assassinations since 2010. In his affidavit in Ruta v Minister of Home Affairs, Alex Ruta
claimed that he was an intelligence agent who had been sent to South Africa to kill
opponents of President Kagame, including Nyamwasa. See Geoffrey York, Another
Rwandon Assassination Plot Exposed, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/ruling-by-south-african-court-exposes-
details-of-latest-rwandan-assassinationplotlarticle 3 7 4 1701 7 .
253. See Khadija Patel, Rwanda's General Nyamwasa and the Politics of Granting
Refugee Status in South Africa, DAILY MAVERICK (Oct. 30, 2012),
http://dailymaverick.co.zalarticle/2012-10-31-rwandas-general-nyamwasa-and-the-politics-
of-granting-refugee-status-in-sa; see also SA rejects Rwanda bid to extradite officer,
REUTERS (Nov. 23, 2011), http-//www.iol.co.za/news/africa/sa-rejects-rwanda-bid-to-
extradite -officer- 1185009.
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scenario, however, provided the justification for the cessation of refugee
status of Angolan refugees in South Africa in 2013.
Angola went through a devastating civil war from 1975 to 2002.254
An estimated over one-and-a-half million people died during the twenty-
seven-year civil war due to fighting, malnutrition, disease, and
deliberate political executions; over four million people were displaced
internally, and about six hundred thousand became refugees, mostly in
the neighbouring countries of Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, South Africa, Namibia, and Zambia. 255 When the civil war ended
in 2002, more than 457,000 were still living in these countries, with
Zambia alone hosting more than 225,000 refugees. 256 Following the end
of the war, many of these refugees were repatriated to Angola with the
assistance of the UNHCR. 257 In 2011, the UNHCR declared that
conditions in Angola had improved and that it was safe for refugees to
return home. 258 This was done in terms of the provisions on "ceased
circumstances" of the UN Refugee Convention. 259
In May 2013, upon the advice of the UNHCR and pursuant to
section 5(1) of the Refugees Act, South Africa formally declared the
cessation of refugee status for all Angolan refugees. Angolans thus
254. The war erupted after the country's declaration of independence in 1975. Initially it
involved three parties fighting over control of the country: the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA), and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). However, the FNLA was
decisively defeated by the MPLA in 1976. Thereafter, the civil war continued between the
MPLA, who had taken control of most of the country and formed the internationally
recognized government, and UNITA, regarded by most countries as a rebel group
supported militarily by the apartheid government in South Africa.
255. See THE REPATRIATION OF ANGOLAN REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLAcED
PERSONS, CFR (Nov. 19, 2002), www.cfr.org/report/repatriation-angolan-refugees-
internally-displaced-persons.html; see also Sergio Carciotto, Angolan Refugees in South
Africa: Alternatives to Permanent Repatriation?, 2 AFR. HUM. MOBILITY REV. 362, 369-70
(2016).
256. Jonathan Crush & Abel Chikanda, Forced Migration in Southern Africa, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REFUGEE AND FORCED MIGRATION STUDIES 554, 560 (Elena
Fiddian-Oasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long & Nando Sigona eds., 2014).
257. See Manuel Cristovao Simao, Repatriation to Angola Officially Ends After 410,000
Go Home, UNHCR (Mar. 26, 2007), http://www.unhcr.org/4607b7d24.html.
258. United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees, Implementation of the Comprehensive
Strategy for the Angolan Refugee Situation, including UNHCR's Recommendations on the
Applicability of the "Ceased Circumstances" Cessation Clauses, at 2 (Jan. 15, 2012).
259. See UN Refugee Convention, supra note 10, art. 1.C(5), ("This Convention shall
cease to apply to any person falling under section A if: . . . [he] can no longer, because the
circumstances in connection with which he as recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist,
continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality.").
This language is reproduced verbatim in the OAU Refugee Convention, art. 1(4).
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became the first refugees in South Africa to have their status ceased.
According to Sergio Carciotto, the declaration had two effects:
[Firstly], the South African government agreed with the
UNHCR recommendation that Angola was no longer a
country producing genuine refugees. Secondly, this
allowed the Department of Home Affairs to find durable
solutions for those individuals whose refugee status
could be reversed by the Standing Committee on
Refugee Affairs. 260
The cessation was intended to apply to refugees that fled Angola
during the period from 1961, when the war of independence from
Portugal commenced, to 2002, when the civil war conclusively ended
with the signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding on April
4, 2002 between the Government of Angola and UNITA. 261 By the end of
2012, there were reported to be 16,529 Angolan nationals in South
Africa, of whom 3,100 had refugee status. 262 Several options were
offered to the refugees under the cessation arrangement. First, the
UNHCR and the South African and Angolan governments would assist
those who opted for voluntary repatriation to Angola. Second, those who
wished to remain in South Africa were issued with a two-year
temporary visa, subject to a December 15, 2013, cut-off date, provided
they obtained a national passport from the Angolan authorities. Third,
Angolan refugees who chose to retain their refugee status could apply
for an exemption from the cessation regime as permitted under section
5(2) of the Refugees Act and the UNHCR Guidelines on Exemption
Procedures in Respect of Cessation Declaration.263 Finally, refugees who
260. Carciotto, supra note 255, at 371 (citation omitted).
261. Permanent Rep. of Angola to the U.N., Letter dated April 25, 2002 from the
Permanent Rep. of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/483 (Apr. 26, 2002) (including a copy of the
memorandum of understanding between Angola and UNITA).
262. Carciotto, supra note 255, at 372 (citing information released by the Department of
Home Affairs during a meeting held with the Angolan community in Cape Town, South
Africa, on Jun. 16, 2012).
263. Section 5 ("Legal Basis for Exemption"), para. 20 states that: "There are two
categories of persons for whom general cessation does not apply, and whose applications
for exemption need not be considered, namely: those who continue to have a well-founded
fear of persecution; and those who have compelling reasons arising out of previous
persecution for refusing to avail themselves of the protection of their country of origin."
Para. 21 goes on to provide that it is immaterial whether refugee status was accorded on
the basis of the 1951 Convention or an extended definition (i.e. under Article 1(2) of the
OAU Refugee Convention). See Guidelines on Exemption Procedures in Respect of
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opted for local integration-considered one of the "durable solutions"
along with repatriation and resettlement in a third country-had their
refugee status withdrawn. 264 Local integration assumes that refugees
voluntarily choose to remain in their country of asylum, with full legal
rights, and find a solution to their plight in that country. Ideally,
although not necessarily, this involves the acquisition of citizenship. 265
The circumstances for cessation of refugee status contemplated in
section 5(1) of the Refugees Act have been significantly expanded in the
most recent iteration of the Regulations to the Refugees Act
promulgated by the Minister of Home Affairs on December 27, 2019.266
Article 4(1)(a) of the Regulations sets out an extensive list of the
circumstances under which a refugee loses his or her refugee status
as follows:
The circumstances as contemplated in section 5(1)(a) of
the Act in terms of which a person may be deemed to
have re-availed himself or herself of origin, nationality
or residence shall, amongst others, relate to where such
a person voluntarily-
(a) seeks consular services at any diplomatic
mission representing his or her country of origin or
nationality;
(b) applies for any assistance or official document, such
as a travel document or citizenship related document at
any diplomatic mission representing his or her country
of origin or nationality whether in the Republic or any
other country;
Cessation Declaration, UNHCR (Dec. 11 2011), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/
4eef5c3a2.pdf.
264. Refugee status may be withdrawn in terms of section 5(3) of the Refugees Act and
Regulation 17 of the Refugees Regulations (providing that when the Standing Committee
on Refugee Affairs intends withdrawing status from a refugee, it must give the refugee
written notice of its intention to do so, including reasons thereof, and must invite written
representations from the refugee within thirty days; and that it no representations are
made or if the representations do not persuade the committee otherwise, it may withdraw
the refugee's status).
265. Jonathan Crisp, Local Integration and Local Settlement of Refugees: A Conceptual
and Historical Analysis, NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RES. 3 (UNHCR Working Paper No. 102).
266. See Refugees Act, 1998 (Act No. 130 of 1998), Refugees Regulations; Republic of
South Africa, Government Gazette, No. 42932, Proclamation No. R. 1707, Dec. 27, 2019.
The Regulations became effective on Jan. 1, 2020.
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(c) avails himself or herself of any assistance of any
State official or State institution associated with or in
his or her country of origin or nationality;
(d) presents himself or herself on the premises of any
diplomatic mission representing his or her country of
origin or nationality in the Republic or any other
country;
(e) travels abroad other than with a refugee travel
document issued in terms of section 31 of the Act;
(f) applies for and receives any benefit afforded to
citizens of his or her country of nationality;
(g) stands for political office or votes in any election in
respect of his or her country of nationality, without
the approval of the Minister;
(h) whether through a port of entry of or irregularly
enters the territory of his or her country of origin or
nationality or countries where he or she previously
resided prior to entering the Republic to apply for
asylum or takes measures or prepares to do so;
(i) participates in any political campaign or activity
related to his or her country of origin or nationality
whilst in the Republic without the permission of the
Minister; or
(j) travels abroad in violation of the conditions endorsed
on his or her refugee travel document.
These expanded circumstances potentially impact the legal
protections under both the OAU Refugee Convention and UN Refugee
Convention in a number of respects. For example, the ban on
participation in "any political campaign or activity" related to his or her
country of origin or nationality has different implications from the
prohibition of subversive activities under the OAU Refugee
Convention. 267 Political activity is not, of course, synonymous with
267. See OAU Convention on Refugees, supra note 8, art. III. Article III provides: "1.
Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in
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subversive activity. Moreover, under the new regulations, a refugee can
be deported for getting involved in South African politics (Article 4(2)).
But "participation in political activity" is a nebulous term that has not
been defined in the regulations. Would a refugee's presence at a South
African political party's public meeting or campaign rally be construed
as such participation? Similarly, characterizing a refugee who seeks
consular assistance at any diplomatic mission of his or her country of
origin, nationality or residence as "re-availing himself or herself of the
protection of his or her home country" is too broad and vague.
Effectively, this would mean that a refugee who seeks consular
assistance, for example to obtain documents to prove educational
qualifications or marriage in his or her home country, loses his or her
refugee status. A refugee who loses his or her refugee status under
these circumstances automatically becomes an illegal foreigner at a
stroke in terms of the provisions of the Immigration Act and will be
liable to deportation. Some aspects of the new regulations-in particular
those mentioned above-will undoubtedly weaken South Africa's
commitment to the protection of the rights of refugees under its
domestic legislation and the two refugee conventions.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
OAU REFUGEE CONVENTION DEFINITION
A. Definition of a Refugee under South African Law
The definition of a refugee in the Refugees Act incorporates both the
UN Refugee Convention definition and the OAU Refugee Convention
definition. Section 3 of the Act provides as follows:
Subject to Chapter 3, a person qualifies for refugee
status for the purposes of this Act if that person-
(a) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted by
reason of his or her race, tribe, religion, nationality,
political opinion or membership of a particular social
group, is outside the country of his or her nationality
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
particular that he conforms with its laws and regulations as well as measures taken for
the maintenance of public order. He shall also abstain from any subversive activities
against any Member State of the OAU; 2. Signatory States undertake to prohibit refugees
residing in their respective territories from attacking any Member State of the OAU, by
any activity likely to cause tension between Member States, and in particular by use of
arms, through the press or by radio." Id.
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the protection of that country, or, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his or her
former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such
fear, unwilling to return to it; or
(b) owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign
domination or events seriously disturbing or disrupting
public order in either a part or the whole of his or her
country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his
or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge
elsewhere; or
(c) is a dependant of a person contemplated in paragraph
(a) or (b).
The expanded definition in the OAU Refugee Convention is
captured in section 3(b) of the Act, which provides an independent and
sufficient basis for the grant of refugee status so that individuals
granted refugee status under this subsection acquire the same rights
and responsibilities under the Act as those under subsections (a) and (c).
Tamara Wood has noted that two changes characterize the definition
incorporated in the South African Refugees Act: "[Fjirst, the words 'or
disrupting' have been inserted into the phrase 'events seriously
disturbing public order'; and second, the final clause has been changed
from requiring a person to seek refuge 'outside his or her country of
origin' to merely requiring that he or she seek refuge 'elsewhere."'
268
The drafting history of the Act does not establish whether these changes
were deliberate efforts to alter the wording of the OAU Refugee
Convention or merely accidental. But, as Wood also points out, these
modifications do not undermine the protection envisaged under the
OAU Refugee Convention. On the contrary, she argues that:
[Elven if the alterations could be argued to affect the
scope of the refugee definition, they would make it more,
rather than less, expansive - by adding to the kind of
events that give rise to refugee protection and allowing
an individual to seek asylum without having left his or
her country of origin.269
268. Wood, supra note 23, at 562-63.
269 Id. at 563.
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In any case, the Refugees Amendment Act of 2008 removed these
changes; however, this act is not yet in force.
B. Burden and Standard of Proof and Consequences of Refugee Status
It is important to note, before turning to the elements of refugee
status identified in the OAU Refugee Convention and UN Refugee
Convention, the approach adopted by South African courts regarding
the standard and onus of proving refugee status. Three South African
High Court decisions-Tantoush v. Refugee Appeal Board,2 70 Fang v.
Refugee Appeal Board,27 1 and Van Garderen NO v. The Refugee Appeal
Board272-have declared an applicant seeking refugee status is required
to prove only a reasonable possibility of persecution. In Tantoush v.
Refugee Appeal Board, the Court held that "the normal onus in civil
proceedings is inappropriate in refugee cases. The inquiry has an
inquisitorial element. The burden is mitigated by a lower standard of
proof and a liberal application of the benefit of doubt principle." 273
As noted earlier, an applicant who is recognized as a refugee is
thereby entitled to the rights established for refugees under the
Refugees Act, the Constitution of South Africa, and other relevant
domestic legislation, in particular the Aliens Control Act and
Immigration Act. 274 In a number of cases regarding the rights of non-
nationals, the Constitutional Court has reaffirmed that asylum-seekers
are entitled to most, if not all, of the same rights as refugees and
permanent residents. The Constitutional Court has emphasized that the
Constitution provides full legal protection to refugees to enjoy all the
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights (ss. 7-37) except for those limited
to citizens. 275 In Lawyers for Human Rights v. Minister of Home Affairs,
the Constitutional Court held that "[the] very fabric of our society and
the values embodied in our Constitution could be demeaned if the
freedom and dignity of illegal foreigners are violated in the process of
preserving our national integrity." 276 Although this dictum is related to
"illegal foreigners," it is just as applicable, if not more so, to foreigners
270. Tantoush v. Refugee Appeal Bd. 2008 (1) SA 232 (T) at 269 (S. Afr.).
271. Fang v. Refugee Appeal Bd. 2007 (2) SA 447 (T (S. Afr.).
272. Van Garderen NO v. The Refugee Appeal Bd. (unreported decision 30720/2006 of
June 19, 2007) (S. Afr.).
273. Tantoush 2008 (1) SA 323 (T) at para. 97 (S. Afr.) (citing Fang 2007 (2) SA 447 (T)).
But see Kumah v. Minister of Home Affairs 2018 (2) SA 510 (GJ) at para. 29 (S. Afr.).
These decisions referred to the UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, ¶ 196, 197.
274. Refugees Act 130 of 1998 § 27 (S. Afr.).
275. See S. APR. CONST., 1996 §§ 7-37.
276. 2004 (7) BCLR 775 (CC) at para. 20 (S. Afr.).
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that are legally on South African territory, such as permanent residents
and refugees.
In Minister of Home Affairs v. Watchenuka,277 a case decided in the
previous year, the Supreme Court of Appeal declared unconstitutional a
prohibition against working and studying for asylum-seekers who do not
yet have refugee status. The Court found that South Africa's
international obligations, including the UN Refugee Convention, the
OAU Refugee Convention, and the UDHR, "are governed by the
Refugees Act No 130 of 1998."278 It held that "[human] dignity has no
nationality. It is inherent in all people-citizens and non-citizens
alike-simply because they are human. And while that person happens
to be in this country-for whatever reason-it must be respected, and is
protected, by [section 10 of] the Bill of Rights." 279 The government is
obliged to ensure that there is no gap between this legal protection and
the practical protection afforded to refugees and asylum-seekers.
C. Interpretation of the Expanded Refugee Definition
in the OAU Refugee Convention
1. Events Seriously Disturbing Public Order
The OAU Refugee Convention expands refugee protection, as noted
earlier, to cover persons who are compelled to leave their homes "owing
to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events
seriously disturbing public order." 280 Various commentators have
argued that the scope of this provision is unclear, particularly as it
relates to "events seriously disturbing public order."281 There has been
limited published research on the actual implementation of the
expanded OAU Refugee Convention definition in South Africa.28 2 The
existing academic literature and the findings and accounts by refugee
practitioners and activists share the conclusion that, in practice, Courts
277. 2004 (1) All SA 21 (SCA) at para. 20 (S. Afr.).
278. Id. ¶ 2.
279. Id. ¶ 25.
280. OAU Convention on Refugees, supra note 8, art. 1(2),
281. See, e.g., Schreier, supra note 23, at 61; Tamara Wood, Fragile States and
International Protection Under the 1969 African Refugee Convention, 43 FORCED
MIGRATION REV. 17, 19 (2013). See generally Okoth-Obbo, supra note 44; Sharpe, supra
note 11 (evaluating the OAU's refugee definition).
282. See Amit, supra note 23; Schreier, supra note 281; Wood, supra note 23; Kaajal
Ramjathan-Keogh, Country Report: Refugee Status Determination in South Africa, Paper
presented at Refugee Status Determination and Rights in Southern and East Africa
Regional Workshop, Kampala, Uganda (Nov. 16-17, 2010) (available at
https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/fles/files-1/dp-rsd-south-africa-2010.pdf).
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and officials fail to apply the expanded definition even in cases where
the applicants base their claims on the existence of the type of
generalized harm in their home countries arising from situations the
expanded refugee definition intended to cover: war, internal conflict,
violence, insecurity, etc.283
Among the few studies on the subject, Amit's analysis of 324
decisions rejecting asylum claims is one of the most instructive. 2
Among other issues, Amit has given particular attention to issues of
implicit bias, a lack of understanding and misapplication of
international and domestic refugee law, and incompetence and
corruption among government officials concerned with processing these
applications. Some of these findings and observations bear reproducing
here. Amit found that government officials based many of the status
determination decisions on errors of law:
RSDOs failed to properly apply several aspects of
refugee law, including the key concept of persecution, as
well as the well-founded fear and credibility elements.
Moreover, few RSDOs correctly understood or utilized
section 3(b) of the Refugees Act. Finally, many RSDOs
demanded a more rigorous standard of proof than that
required by refugee law, despite domestic court rulings
to the contrary. 285
Later in the same study, Amit returns to the theme of misapprehension
and misapplication of the law in status determination cases. It is worth
quoting her in extenso:
RSDOs routinely misapplied the core concepts of
international refugee law. However, they also
erroneously applied elements of domestic refugee law.
Section 3(b) of South Africa's Refugees Act incorporates
a provision from the OAU refugee convention that
grants refugee status to individuals who have been
compelled to leave their place of habitual residence
"owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign
domination or events seriously disturbing or disrupting
public order in either a part or the whole of his or her
country of origin or nationality".
283. Wood, supra note 23, at 564. See, e.g., Somali Assn of S. Afr. v. Refugee Appeal Bd.
2019 ZAGPPHC at 19 para 33.
284. See Amit, supra note 23, at 461.
285. Id. at 464 (citations omitted).
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RSDOs seemed largely ignorant of this provision. In
fact, they often cited British case law stating exactly the
opposite proposition, that fleeing the instability of civil
war does not qualify an individual for asylum .... [The]
differential impact criterion is a requirement of section
3(a) alone. The Section 3(b) provision, by contrast, is
distinguished by the fact that eligibility rests solely on
the presence of general conditions of instability and does
not require an individualized assessment revealing a
differential impact. Yet, RSDOs frequently and
mistakenly based their rejections on the lack of
individual persecution without considering whether the
individual had a claim based on Section 3(b). Many of
these decisions acknowledged that the individual was
fleeing political instability, but only analyzed the claim
under the Section 3(a) criteria of individual persecution .
286
Amit is quite categorical in her conclusion about the failures of
South Africa's asylum policy and the effects of the interaction between
immigration policy and refugee protection. She states that South
Africa's refugee policy: "[has] become a mechanism of immigration
control, at great cost to genuine asylum seekers, who are unable to avail
themselves of the rights provided to them under refugee law," and "[b]y
failing to fulfil its core protective purpose, South Africa's refugee system
has become superfluous, operating instead as a regulatory mechanism
for economic migrants."287
Aside from wars or generalized harm, it is possible to interpret
"events seriously disturbing public order" to include people fleeing non-
discriminatory deprivations of their human rights resulting from the
complete socio-economic breakdown or State-State failure or collapse.
However, South Africa has chosen not to accept such an interpretation
of the definition. South Africa has seen a significant influx of
Zimbabwean nationals fleeing into the country over the last decade or
so. Yet applications for refugee status made by Zimbabweans claiming
refuge from this situation have been almost universally rejected. 288
286. Id. at 473.
287. Id. at 487-88.
288. See JONATHAN CRUSH ET AL., SOUTH AFRICA CASE STUDY: THE DOUBLE CRISIS -
MASS MIGRATION FROM ZIMBABWE AND XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 11, 18
(2017) (drawing upon the UNHCR Population Statistics Database (2016), the authors note
that out of 587,520 asylum applications by Zimbabweans covering the period 2003 to 2015,
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South African authorities mostly consider these applicants to be
"economic migrants" fleeing the economic meltdown in their country,
and not "political refugees" or "forced migrants". Thus, in Chihomba v.
Chairperson: Refugee Appeal Board, the Court held that "[t]he principle
of non-refoulement addresses bona fide Applicants for asylum and is
incapable to cover economic migrants who enter South Africa to benefit
financially. The political situation in Zimbabwe has settled down over
the years and most Zimbabwean Nationals who travel to South Africa
do so for economic reasons." 289 The Court concluded that the relative
stability of law and order in the country meant that the applicant's case
fell outside the scope of the OAU Refugee Convention. The applicant
had adduced evidence of his long years of political involvement with the
major opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, and
climate of fear and political violence that followed the country's disputed
elections of 2008, after which he left for South Africa. The Court held
that, by his own account, the applicant came to South Africa to seek
employment and, among other things, to assist his mother with securing
anti-retroviral medicines that she was denied in Zimbabwe. More
pointedly, the Court did not accept that he had a well-founded fear of
persecution, noting:
It does not appear from the application why the
Applicant still, after more than 6 years, requires
protection. Nothing appears from the application why he
is unable to re-avail himself to his country of origin so
long after he feared persecution shortly before the 2008
National General Elections. On the probabilities the
circumstances which gave rise to the Applicant's fears
have longed ceased. The fact that his mother was
deprived of anti-retroviral medication does not give rise
to "a well-founded fear of being persecuted", envisaged in
Section 3(a) of the Act.290
Wood has reviewed the practice of some States in the implementation of
the OAU Refugee Convention and its role in protecting persons fleeing
fragile States in the context of the Convention's expanded definition of a
refugee. She concludes that:
only 153,924 (26%) were adjudicated, of which 1,292 (less than 1%) were granted refugee
status).
289. Chihomba v. Chairperson: Refugee Appeal Bd. 2015 ZAGPPHC 444 at 29 paras.
31.4-32.
290. Id. 31.1-31-
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While the . .. examples do not provide a comprehensive
assessment of the implementation of the 1969
Convention or its role in protecting persons fleeing
fragile States across the whole of Africa, they are
suggestive of both of the potential and the limitations of
the Convention in responding to displacement from
fragile States. In particular, they suggest that States
may be more willing to apply the 1969 Convention to
persons in situations where the perceived cause of
displacement is the existence of armed conflict and a
breakdown in law and order. Where persons flee the
many other symptoms of State fragility-including poor
governance, food insecurity and lack of access to basic
services-such application is less straightforward. 291
The approach taken in Chihomba was based on its characterization
of the asylum-seeker's country of origin, Zimbabwe, as neither in a
fragile state nor in a continuing situation of armed conflict or
generalized violence. This contrasts with the position taken in
Harerimana v. Chairperson of the Refugee Appeals Board and Others.292
Here, the court found the asylum seeker who had fled Burundi and
applied for asylum on arrival in South Africa was entitled to refugee
status. 293 It noted Burundi was still a fragile country that was
witnessing the emergence of violent political banditry and that the
applicant had been denied refugee status because the RSDO
erroneously assessed his application on the basis of section 3(a) of the
Refugees Act ("[owing] to a well-founded fear of persecution") when the
applicant based his case on section 3(b) ("[events] seriously disturbing or
disrupting public order). Significantly, Davis J. cited with approval
Amit's conclusions quoted in extenso above. 294
The misconstruction of section 3(b) by the RSDOs is compounded by
the fact that it also remains unclear whether the term "events seriously
disturbing public order" extends to natural disasters, as has been
asserted by some commentators. 295 In Rahim v. The Minister of Home
291. See Wood, supra note 281, at 18.
292. Harerimana v. Chairperson of the Refugee Appeal Bd. 2014 (5) SA 550 (WCC).
293. Id. T 43.
294. Id. ¶ 41.
295. The contention that "events seriously disturbing public order extends to natural
disasters has been asserted by some commentators. See, e.g., G. NALDI, THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS ROLE 83 (2d ed. 1999).
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Affairs, the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed a claim to refugee
status based on flooding.296
2. Political Opinion
There is no authoritative definition of the term "political opinion,"
neither under the UN Refugee Convention nor the OAU Refugee
Convention, nor under international law more generally. 297 Political
opinion can be understood in the broad sense to include "any opinion on
any matter in which the machinery of State, government, society or
policy may be engaged." 298 The Michigan Guidelines on Risk for Reasons
of Political Opinion have described "political opinion" as "[an] opinion
about the nature, policies, or practices of a State or of an entity that has
the capacity, legitimately or otherwise, to exercise societal power or
authority." 299 A number of domestic decisions in Canada, New Zealand,
and the United States have also developed the meaning of "political
opinion."3 00 In INS v. Elias-Zacarias,301 the US Supreme Court held
that a refusal by Elias-Zacarias to take sides with any political faction
in Guatemala was not an affirmative expression of a political opinion.
Accordingly, Elias-Zacarias's claim that he would be persecuted on his
return to Guatemala on the basis of political opinion failed because of
his inability to adduce evidence that he either supported the
government or the guerrilla movement. The Court found that he had
failed to show a political motive for his refusal to undergo military
service, and that he had not shown that the guerrillas threatened him
because of his political opinion. 302 Courts in the United States have
296. Rahim v. The Minister of Home Affairs 2015 (92) ZASCA (SCA) at para. 26 (S. Afr.).
297. See generally Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee Law, The
Michigan Guidelines on Risk for Reasons of Political Opinion, 37 MrCH. J. INT'L L. 234
(2016) (discussing various considerations relevant to the meaning of the term "political
opinion"). See also C. Dauvergne, Toward a New Framework for Understanding Political
Opinion, 37 MICH. J. INT'L L. 243 (2016) (defining the meaning of "political opinion"
generally).
298. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 47, ¶ 51. See also Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Ward,
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.); GOODWIN-GILL & McADAM, supra note 79, at 49.
299. See Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee Law, supra note 298, at
234, 236.
300. See, e.g., Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.); Gutierrez Gomez
v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [T. Admtivos.] [Administrative Tribunals] novembre
24, 2000, 1 WLR 549 (Colom.); Refugee Appeal No. 76044 (2008) NZAR 719 (N.Z); Refugee
Appeal No. 76339 (2010) NZAR 386 (N.Z.).
301. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483.
302. Id. at 583 (stating that "Elias-Zacarias still has to establish that the record also
compels the conclusion that he has a 'well-founded fear' that the guerrillas will persecute
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generally concluded that imputed political opinion remains a viable
ground for a successful claim to asylum based on political opinion even
after the Supreme Court's ruling in this case. 303
Conflictingly, courts in Canada have held that political opinion may
be imputed to an individual by his or her government or other agent of
persecution. 304 In Ricardo Andizes Inzunza Orellana v. M.E.L, the
Federal Court of Appeal held that "[it] should not be whether the Board
considers that the applicant has engaged in political activities, but
whether the ruling government of the country from which he claims to
be a refugee considers his conduct to have been styled as political
activity."30 5
In a number of States Parties to the UN Refugee Convention,
courts have held that, in terms of Article l.F of the Convention, an
applicant who has committed a politically motivated crime in his or her
own country of origin is not entitled to refugee status where the crime
was a war crime, a crime against humanity, or an act of terrorism. 306
This issue was addressed in the South African case Tshiyombo v.
Members of the Refugee Appeal Board. 307 In this case, applicant
Kenneth Tshiyombo claimed that he had been kidnapped and forced to
join a rebellion against the government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo in the Eastern part of the country. Although he had no
"actual" alliance to the rebel group-his membership having been
coerced-he feared persecution on account of his "perceived association"
with it. The Court found "it did not matter for the purpose of his asylum
application that the applicant did not share the political opinions of the
him because of that political opinion, rather than because of his refusal to fight with
them.").
303. See Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1488-89 (9th Cir. 1997); Ravindran v. INS, 976
F.2d 754, 760 (1st Cir. 1992); Rajaratnam v. Moyer, 832 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. III 1993). See
also T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 1095
(4th ed. 1998); Shayna S. Cook, Repairing the Legacy of INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 23 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 223 (2002).
304. Imputed political opinion has been accepted in Canadian jurisprudence in a string
of Federal Court of Appeal decisions, including: Hilo v. M.E.I., [1991] 130 N.R. 236 (Can.);
Amayo v. M.E.I., [1982] 1 F.C. 250 (Can.); Jerez-Spring v. M.E.I., [1981] 2 F.C. 527 (Can.);
Gonzalez v. M.E.I., [1981] 2 F.C. 781 (Can.); Astudillo v. M.E.I., [19791 31 N.R. 121 (Can.).
305. Ricardo Andizes Inzunza Orellana v. M.E.I., [1979] 103 DLR (3d) 105 (Can.).
306. INS v. Aquirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. 1439 (1999); T. v. Immigration Officer [1996]
UKHL 8 (HL); Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1
S.C.R. 3 (Can.). See generally P.J. VAN KRIEKEN, REFUGEE LAW IN CONTEXT: THE
ExcLUsIoN CLAUSE (1999) (describing when an individual is not entitled to refugee
status).
307. Tshiyombo v. Members of the Refugee Appeal Bd. 2016 (4) SA 469 (WCC) at para.
29 (S. Afr.).
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rebel group or had not voluntarily been a member of it."308 The Court
noted that the Refugee Appeal Board had concluded that the applicant
was not entitled to refugee status without any reference to section 4 of
the Refugees Act and had, by mere inference and without concrete
evidence, rejected his claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution
because "he had been a willing member of the rebel group and had
probably participated in gross human rights violations." 309 The Court
rejected the Board's reasoning and set aside its decision to reject the
applicant's appeal against the rejection of his application by the
RSDO.310
More recently, the Constitutional Court of South Africa considered
the question of a political crime for purposes of exclusion from refugee
status in Gavri6 v. Refugee Status Determination Officer, whose facts
were discussed earlier.3 1' The decision is particularly important here for
its authoritative analyses of the nature of a political crime and the
principle of non-refoulement.
The Constitutional Court dealt in some depth with the nature of a
political crime for purposes of the exclusion clause under section 4(1)(b)
of the Refugees Act. The Court stated that "egregious acts of violence,
such as acts commonly considered to be of a 'terrorist' nature that are
wholly disproportionate to any political objective, will be unlikely to
pass the test for political crimes." 312 However, the Court also expressed
"the concern that one nation's terrorist may be another's freedom fighter
. . . [and that] this is particularly true where an organization advances
the values of human rights, freedom and tolerance against a despotic or
intolerant government . . . [and concluded] that a content-neutral test is
helpful in outlining relevant factors, but fails to take these important
contextual considerations into account." 313 The court also concluded that
"the approach to establishing whether a crime is political should be
flexible, not overly inclusive or exclusive, and should also take into
account our own historical context."3 14 The Court was referring to the
context in which South African courts during the apartheid era were
308. Id.
309. Id. ¶ 31.
310. Id. ¶ 47.
311. See Gavrid v. Refugee Status Determination Officer, Cape Town 2018 (38) ZACC 1
(CC) (S. Afr.).
312. Id. ¶ 94 (the Court invoking the "predominance test" stipulated in UNHCR's
Guidelines on International Protection. Application of Exclusion Clauses, Guideline No. 5,
para. 15, and stating that according to this test, where there is no clear link between the
crime and its alleged political motive, non-political motives are deemed predominant, and
that such non-political motives may include personal reasons or gain).
313. Id. T 105.
314. Id. ¶ 106.
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almost always inclined, if not politically expected, to dismiss alleged
political crimes as terrorist acts.
While Gavri6 was successful in challenging the RSDO's decision on
the basis of procedural unfairness,3 15 the Court found that he did not
meet the requirements for refugee status according to the Refugees Act.
In addition, the Court recognized the imperative behind the principle of
non-refoulement. It took that view that while Gavri6 had not committed
a political crime for which he would be persecuted should he be
extradited to Serbia, he was nevertheless entitled to have his
application considered fairly in accordance with the prevailing
procedures., even if it was the Court's view that he did not satisfy the
substantive criteria for the recognition of refugee status.
The Gavri6 judgment speaks to the duty of South Africa to abide by
its obligations under the UN Refugee Convention and the OAU Refugee
Convention, as well as customary international law obligations, and
simultaneously to protect the rights of those who, by whatever
unfortunate circumstances, find themselves seeking refuge within its
borders.
3. Membership of a Particular Social Group
The UNHCR recognizes that "[m]embership of a particular social
group may be at the root of persecution because there is no confidence in
the group's loyalty to the [g]overnment or because of the political
outlook, antecedents or economic activity of its [government's
policies]."316 It has been suggested that "membership of a particular
social group" as a ground for persecution justifying a claim for refugee
status is "the ground with the least clarity."3 17 It is also a category that
has, in recent years, received growing attention, as the number of
refugee claims based on it has increased dramatically. 318
A test for this category was developed in the seminal case of Ward v.
Canada (Attorney-General).319 In that case, "a particular social group"
315. Id. ¶¶ 78-81.
316. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, at para. 78.
317. See generally MICHELLE FOSTER, THE 'GROUND WITH THE LEAST CLARITY': A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO 'MVEMBERSHIP OF
A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP', UNHCR, LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY RESEARCH SERIES
NO. 25 (2012), http://www.unhcr.org/protect. See also James C. Hathaway & Michelle
Foster, Membership of a Particular Social Group, 15 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 477, 477 ¶ 1
(2003).
318. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An
Analysis of the Meaning of Membership of a Particular Social Group', UNHCR GLOBAL
CONSULTATIONS ON INT'L PROTECTION 263, 264 (2003).
319. [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 737 (Can.).
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was defined as: "(i) groups defined by an innate or unchangeable
characteristic; (ii) groups defined by a characteristic that is
fundamental to human dignity such that a person should not be forced
to relinquish it; and (iii) groups defined by a former status, unalterable
due to its historical permanence." 320 This definition was accepted in
South Africa by the High Court (North Gauteng Division) in Fang v.
Refugee Appeal Board. 321 However, in the more recent case of
Tshiyombo v. Members of the Refugee Appeal Board, the High Court
(Western Cape Division) ventured its own definition of the term
"particular social group," finding that it "denote[s] a section of society
that is identifiable by the common characteristics of the persons
comprising it or of the basis for their mutual coherence." 322 These
decisions were, of course, predicated on the Refugees Act. The South
African legislation is unique in the sense that it provides some guidance
on the content of the term "social group." Section 1(xxi) of the Refugees
Act states that the term "social group" includes, among others, "a group
of persons of particular gender, sexual orientation, disability, class
or caste."
The case law in South Africa, as in the United Kingdom and the US,
is rich with concrete examples of the manifestation of "particular social
groups." One category that emerges from these cases is women at risk of
female genital mutilation (FGM). In R v. Immigration Appeal
Tribunal, 323 the House of Lords was called upon to decide whether
women in Pakistan constituted a particular social group. Lord Steyn
stated that a premise of the UN Refugee Convention was that all
human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms, and that
counteracting discrimination was a fundamental purpose of the
Convention. 324 Lord Hoffman rejected the notion that the term
"particular social group" implies an element of cohesiveness,
cooperation, or interdependence, and accepted that "social group" could
include individuals fearing persecution on "such basis as gender,
linguistic background and sexual orientation." 325 In another case 326 the
House of Lords held that a woman from Iran who was victimized
because of her husband's political activities had a well-founded fear of
320. FOSTER, supra note 317, at 7.
321. 2007 (2) SA 432 (T) (S. Mr.) (the judge stating: "I associate myself with the
categories of particular social groups as enumerated in the Canadian case of Ward.").
322- Tshiyombo v. Members of the Refugee Appeal Bd. 2016 (4) SA 469 (WCC) at para.
29 (S. Afr.).
323. [1999] 2 All ER 545 (HL).
324. Id. at 551.
325. Id. at 563.
326. See Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. K; Fornah v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't, [2006] UKHL 46.
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persecution by virtue of her membership of a particular social group,
that is, her husband's family. In another case, the court held that a
young woman from Sierra Leone, who feared that if she returned to
Sierra Leone she would be at risk of FGM, had a well-founded fear of
persecution because she belonged to a particular social group, namely
the group of prospectively adult women in Sierra Leone who had not yet
undergone FGM. Similarly, in In re: Kasinga, 327 the US Board of
Immigration Appeals considered the asylum claim of a nineteen-year-
old Togolese woman on the basis that as a member of a social group-
the particular tribe to which she belonged-she would be forced to
undergo FGM. The Board found that the particular social group of
young women in her tribe who had not undergone FGM as practiced by
that tribe, and who opposed the practice, fit the definition of members of
a particular social group. 328 The US Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit confirmed this decision in Abankwah v. INS. 329
In South Africa, in Fang v. Refugee Appeal Board,330 the High Court
rejected the notion that because he had more than one child, Mr. Fang
was a member of a particular social group and that if returned to the
People's Republic of China, he would fall foul of that country's one-child-
per-family policy. However, in Jacob van Garderen NO v. The Refugee
Appeal Board,33 1 the High Court held that three young girls from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo faced a real risk of persecution on
account of their membership of a social group, namely, that of female
children. The Court set aside the RSDO's decision to deny refugee
status to the applicants and ruled that they were entitled to refugee
status as members of a group that might be persecuted by
armed groups.
327. In re Kasinga, 35 I.L.M. 1145 (1996).
328. See Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 25 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting the "BIA did not
dispute that Abankwah's fear of genital mutilation was on account of her membership in a
cognizable social group."); cf. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986)
(noting a "class of young, working class, urban males of military age does not exemplify
the type of 'social group' for which the immigration laws provide protection from
persecution."). See generally Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a
Social Group as a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 39 (1983)
(examining the development of the "social group" category within its domestic and
international background).
329. Abankwah v. INS, 38 I.L.M. 1267 (2d Cir. 1999) ("the decision of the BIA that
Abankwah is not eligible for asylum is reversed").
330. Fang v. Refugee Appeal Bd. 2007 (2) SA 447 (T) at 454 B (S. Afr.) ("[T]hose resisting
a valid State policy such as population control do not qualify as refugees.").
331. See South African Judicial Decisions, 33 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 511, 520 (2006).
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CONCLUSION
South Africa has been a major refugee receiving country since the
end of apartheid. Although the numbers of asylum seekers have
declined significantly from the high levels of a decade ago, there can be
no doubt that the refugee issue still remains significant for South Africa
domestically and internationally. Domestically, since 1994, the problem
of refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa has often been conflated
with that of illegal or undocumented migrants. The inauguration of the
new post-apartheid government was almost immediately followed by
alarmist accounts of unprecedented numbers of foreigners from other
African countries descending upon South Africa's borders. These
accounts also pointed at the emerging xenophobia, which was directed
equally at refugees and illegal migrants. 332 The phenomenon of
xenophobia, with occasional outbreaks of public violence especially
directed at persons from other African countries, reached its apogee in
May 2008 and has continued to the present day. 333 The most recent
upsurge in violence against migrants occurred in the first week of
September 2019, mainly in the cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria in
Gauteng Province: the country's economic heartland. As on previous
occasions, these attacks were directed exclusively at Africans-hence
dubbed "Afrophobic" by some commentators and government
officials 334 -and resulted in the deaths of at least twelve people
332. See, e.g., Kevin Tessier, The Challenge of Immigration Policy in the New South
Africa, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 255 (1995); Judith Matloff, Flood of Illegals Stymie
a New South Africa, CHRIST. Scl. MONIT. (Jan. 5, 1995), at 5, https://www.csmonitor
.com/1995/0105/05071.html; Liz Sly, South Africa is the New Lure for Continent's Refugees,
Cmc. TRIB. (Oct. 9, 1994), https://www.chicago tribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1994-10-09-
9410090444-story.html.
333. See generally Jonathan Crush, The Dark Side of Democracy: Migration, Xenophobia
and Human Rights in South Africa, 38 INTL MIGRATION 103 (2001) (documenting reports
of citizen intolerance of non-citizens through surveys by the Southern African Migration
Project); Anuoluwapo Durokifa & Edwin 0. Ijeoma, The Post-Apartheid Xenophobic
Attacks in South Africa: A Reflection on Government Interferences, 31 AFR. POPULATION
STUD. 3293 (2017) (asserting "that combatting xenophobic violence is more than merely
altering or implementing a policy but requires addressing the fundamental basis that
triggers conflict on which citizens lay their claim."); Braam Hanekom & Leigh Ann
Webster, The Role of South Africa's Government in the Xenophobic Violence of May 2008,
13 U. PENN. J. L. & Soc. CHANGE 91 (2009-10) (exploring "the systems, conditions, and
environment that gave rise to the infamous xenophobic violence that occurred in South
Africa in May 2008"); Martin J. Murray, Alien Strangers in Our Midst: The Dreaded
Foreign Invasion and Fortress South Africa, 37 CAN. J. AFR. STUD. 440 (2003) (using a
"montage of anti-immigrant violence"); see generally Tella, supra note 7.
334. Notably, Naledi Pandor, South Africa's Minister for International Relations,
purposefully used this term in her interview with Stephen Sackur on the BBC's HardTalk
program that aired on Sep. 20, 2019. See South Africa's Naledi Pandor on 'Afrophobia,
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including both foreign nationals and South Africans. According to the
UNHCR, "at least 1,500 foreign nationals, predominantly migrants but
also refugees and asylum seekers, have been forced to flee their
homes." 335 Hundreds of people, mostly from Nigeria, but also from
Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, sought to return to their home
countries for safety. Xenophobia in South Africa thus continues to be an
issue that occasionally permeates South African domestic politics and
sub-regional relations, not only with neighboring countries but also
other countries farther afield, such as Ghana and Nigeria. 336
The conflation of refugee and migration issues was compounded by
the fact that until the Refugees Act came into operation on April 1,
2000, administrators dealt with asylum applications under the Aliens
Control Act, which made no provision for refugees. Thus, South Africa's
policy toward non-nationals, including asylum seekers, reflected the
sentiment that immigrants' and asylum seekers' rights should be as
limited as possible. In practice, there was little understanding of the
difference between asylum seekers and other immigrants, with the
consequence that South African government authorities did not
differentiate between types of non-nationals when determining the
rights and services that non-nationals were entitled to. As is evident
from the cases in which asylum seekers have appealed adverse
decisions, some RSDOs and other decision-makers seemingly continue
to lack a basic understanding of the scope and implications of the
expanded refugee definition under Article I. paragraph 2 of the OAU
Refugee Convention and the protection that asylum seekers are entitled
to. Moreover, they do not always seem to appreciate fully the problems
that individuals entering South Africa from refugee-producing
countries, such as Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Zimbabwe face, nor do they show any empathy
even when presented with the relevant information. While the
ratification of the UN Refugee Convention and the OAU Refugee
Convention and their subsequent domestication represented significant
developments for the protection of refugees and asylum seekers in South
Africa, practice has not always matched legal principle. Officials
BBC NEWS (Sep. 18, 2019), https/Iwww.bbc.comlnews/av/world-africa-49746180/south-
africa-s-naledi-pandor-on-afrophobia.
335. See Charlie Yaxldy, Amid Rising Xenophobic Attacks in South Africa, UNHCR
Ramps Up Aid for Refugees, Calls for Urgent Action, UNHCR (Sep. 20, 2019),
https://www.unhcr.orglen-ustnews/briefing/2019/9/5d848f694/amid-rising-xenophobic-
attacks-south-africa-unher-ramps-aid-refugees-calls.html.
336. See generally Francis Nyamnjoh & Patience Mususa, Migration and Xenophobia, in
REGION-BUILDING IN SOUTHERN AFRIcA: PROGRESS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 215-29
(Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa & Dawn Nagger eds., 2012) (discussing aspects of
economic, political, and global integration).
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responsible for implementing the obligations codified in the two
conventions and South Africa's own domestic law continue to
misunderstand and misapply them in their refugee status
determination procedures.
It is in this context that the work of judges in South Africa has been
both salutary and necessary for the protection of the rights of refugees
and asylum seekers. The judicial responses and interpretations in the
cases discussed in this essay bear testimony to the old adage that while
judges may not be comfortable making law through their decisions, they
cannot escape the reality that they do shape and clarify society's
understanding of the law. In the process, they aid and push intransigent
governments to apply the law faithfully or initiate changes in policy if
the law so demands. Twenty-five years have elapsed since South Africa
acceded to the OAU Refugee Convention and the UN Refugee
Convention. And it has been almost two decades since its key domestic
legislation, the Refugees Act, became operative. However, South Africa
is yet to demonstrate a clear appreciation of the scope of the rights and
legal protections that international law and its domestic law extend to
asylum seekers and refugees on its territory. In the absence of
interpretative guidance on the OAU Refugee Convention's expanded
refugee definition, and the paucity of refugee rights jurisprudence from
other jurisdictions among other States Parties to the Convention, the
South African judiciary has borne the responsibility of interpreting
these provisions. The judiciary has also both enriched the growing
jurisprudence around the OAU Refugee Convention and the UN
Refugee Convention and aided their practical application in addressing
the protection of refugees in South Africa. Better awareness of
international and domestic refugee law among government officials, in
particular the authorities responsible for processing asylum applications
and refugee status determination, would contribute to narrowing the
existing gaps between legal protection and practical protection.
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